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Showing contexts for: marker test in Tarun Kumar Halder & Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 6 November, 2008Matching Fragments
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Adulteration of motor spirit and diesel by errant dealers is rampant and has assumed menacing proportion. Introduction of the marker test system is intended to check adulteration. BPCL being one of several Government Oil Companies is duty bound to ensure supply of unadulterated quality motor spirit and diesel to the consumers, lest it is dragged to the Consumer Courts for deficiency in service. To discharge this duty it has appointed the respondent no.4 as its agent to conduct surprise inspection at its retail outlets. In terms of clause 10(g) of the MOA, the petitioners as dealers are under an obligation not to adulterate the petroleum products supplied by BPCL and in terms of clause (o) thereof, they have unconditionally agreed to allow inspection of the retail outlet by the officers, agents and servants of BPCL to test the accuracy and general workings of the pump and other equipments at the said premises. The 1934 Act and the 2005 Order, which has been made by the Central Government in exercise of power conferred by Section 3 of the E.C. Act no doubt provide for testing of samples of petroleum/motor spirit/diesel by duly authorized officers in the manner prescribed. If petroleum is not stored in accordance with rules made under Section 4 of the 1934 Act one would commit a violation of provisions of the statute and may be punished under Section 23 thereof. Similarly, if a dealer indulges in any manner in any one or more of the malpractices defined in clause 2(f) of the 2005 Order, he would be liable to be prosecuted in terms of the E.C. Act. If appropriate and due quantity of petrol and diesel is not supplied, a dealer may be dealt with under the W. & M. Act. Violation of any of the provisions contained therein are social crimes and a person may expose himself to be proceeded against and on proof of violation may suffer penal consequences by being sentenced to imprisonment or by imposition of fine or with both. The liability which one might incur under the 1934 Act or the W. & M. Act or the E.C. Act read with the 2005 Order is not to be confused with the liability that might be incurred by one in terms of the contract between the parties. Proceedings under the 1934 Act and the E.C. Act read with the 2005 Order on the one hand are intended to punish a wrong doer for committing statutory violation whereas proceedings drawn up in terms of an agreement between a Oil Company and its dealer, on the other hand, deal with misconduct. The two proceedings are entirely different and independent of one another and the power conferred under the agreement does not come in conflict with the statutory power available under the 1934 Act and the E.C. Act read with the 2005 Order. Proceedings initiated in terms of an agreement between the Oil Company and the dealer are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. Interfering with proceedings initiated under a contract between the Oil Company and its dealer for taking action against an errant dealer would only result in serving the interest of the dishonest. As in the present case, a finding by BPCL that the petitioners have adulterated diesel would not make them liable to suffer penal consequences envisaged in the 1934 Act or the 1955 Act. However the mere fact that the respondent no.4 is not authorized to collect and test samples in the manner laid down in the statutory provisions would not warrant a finding that BPCL under the terms of the contract is not empowered to engage respondent no.4 and consequently the respondent no.4 is not authorized to inspect the retail outlets of BPCL, and collect and test samples. In the interests of administration and good governance, BPCL has to ensure that on proof of charge of misdemeanor/misconduct an undesirable element is thrown out at the earliest. As has been held in Pink City (supra) exercise of contractual power for initiating action as distinguished from exercise of statutory power is well-accepted in Indian jurisprudence and, therefore, cannot be faulted.