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2. This suit by the tenant has been preceded by a suit by the landlords against the tenant for permanent injunction restraining the latter from making any new constructions, additions or alterations and structural changes to and in the suit-premises. The two suits have been heard together and the suit by the landlords has also been decreed. In the judgment, which is a common one for both the suits, the trial Judge has held that the suit by the landlords for permanent injunction restraining the tenant "from making any permanent construction in the suit premises should be declared"; but it appears that in the decree portion, the Court has permanently restrained the tenant "from making any additions, alterations, construction and structural changes" in the tenanted portion of the premises.

3. Under S. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after a Court has pronounced a judgment, "on such judgment a decree shall follow" and under O. 20, R. 6(1), "the decree shall agree with the judgment". Since in the judgment the trial Court has decided to decree the suit restraining the tenant "from making any permanent construction", the order in the decree restraining the tenant "from making any additions, alterations, constructions and structural changes" must be construed to mean only such additions, alterations, constructions or structures which are of permanent nature. A decree must be so construed as to be intra, and not ultra vires the judgment. The approach should be ut res magis valeat quam pereat, so that it may stand and not fail. If a decree, though apparently going beyond a judgment, may reasonably construe to be agreeing with the latter, it must be so construed.

7. Governing ourselves by these tests, we should have no hesitation to hold that the affixation of a collapsible gate at the entrance of the tenanted premises would not amount to erection of a permanent structure. The evidence of the plaintiff-tenant, PW 1, that fixation of a collapsible gate "is necessary for reason of security" has not been challenged by the landlords-defendants either by cross-examination or by counter-evidence. The intention of the tenant was, therefore, not to have any additional structure, permanent or temporary, but to provide additional security as a measure of safety to himself, the members of his family and their properties against burglary and other risks and hazards. And that intention to provide better security has been given effect to without affecting any structural change of the premises and the purpose of the tenancy. The finding of the trial Judge that the gate "can be removed without causing any irreparable damage to the building" has not also been challenged as incorrect. And, therefore, the tests relating to the mode of affixation of the structure and its removability, as discussed hereinbefore, are also satisfied. The trial Judge, therefore, was right in granting the declaration that the plaintiff-tenant was entitled to affix a collapsible gate at the entrance of his tenanted flat. If, as held by us in Devakinandan Boobna at p.188 (of (1988) 1 Cal HN 180) (supra), improvements are made by the tenant on the property, and on the termination of the tenancy such improvements can be removed and the premises can be restored to its original conditions without any injurious effect, the landlord can have nothing to complain.