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19. It has also been submitted by the learned Advocate for the defendant that the negative covenant cannot be enforced in part and the plaintiff cannot ask for enforcement of the negative covenant in entirity, because the plaintiff has not even asked for fixation of price of Iron ores below 65% F.F. and manganese ore below 30% mn. in this suit. Plaintiffs case, is that the other products have no commercial value. Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned Advocate has submitted that the Agreement in question shows unconscionable bargain between the parties.

58. In any event, there is a specific provision in the contract, viz. Clause 12 containing a negative covenant whereunder the defendant has agreed not to sell or otherwise part with or dispose of any Manganese or Iron Ore from the mines and has further agreed that the plaintiff shall be the sole and only buyer thereof during the continuance of the agreement. The negative covenant is aforesaid is in clear term and is binding on the defendant.

59. It has been argued on behalf of the defendant that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is applicable only at the time of final hearing of the suit, and that no interim order can be passed in pursuance thereof at the interlocutory stage.

77. In any event, there is a negative covenant in the .contract, and in such a case, the question of balance of convenience and whether damages would be adquate remedy or not becomes immaterial:

78. In this connection, I may refer to the observation of Lord Cairns L.C. and in the case of Richard Wheeler Doherty v. James Clagston Allman and W.C. Dowden, re-

ported in (1878) 3 AC 709 All page 719-720. The said report Lord Cairns L.C. observed as follows:

"My Lords, if there had been a negative covenant, I apprehend, according to well settled practice, a Court of Equity would have had no discretion to exercise. If parties, for valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that particular thing shall not be done, all that a Court of Equity has to do is to say, by way of injunction, that which the parties have already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not be done; and in such case the injunction does nothing more than give the sanction of the process of the Court to that which already is the contract between the parties. It is not then a question of the balance of convenience or incovenience, or of the amount of damage or of injury -- it is specific performance, by the Court, of that negative bargain which the parties have made, with their eyes open, between themselves."

88. The other judgment and decision relied upon by the Learned Advocate for the defendant is the case reported in {1989} 3 AH ER 103.

89. The said decision was in respect of case of an employment of contract of service, and the Court held that no order of injunction should be passed to compel the servant to perform his positive obligations.

90. The above decision has no application to the facts of our present case-, where the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a negative covenant.

91. The judgment and decision in the case of S. Ranganathan v. V. Rama Swami (or Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh) refers to the principles for granting interim order of injunction which are well settled. However, in case of a negative covenant, the concept of balance of convenience and damages being adequate remedy become less important as has been laid down in the decision of the House of Lords, in the case of Richard Wheeler Doherty v. James Clagston Allman and W.C. Dowden, reported in (1878) 3 AC 709 at page 720.