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(3) Where the work which the contractor is employed to do is, on the face of it, unlawful.

Section 214: Rule in Bower v. Peate (1875-1 QBD 321). In each of the foregoing classes of cases it is obvious that the employer cannot free himself from liability merely by employing a contractor to do the work for him. And it is believed that all the cases in which an employer has been held responsible, for the negligence of a contractor may be referred to one or other of those exceptions. It was indeed laid down 'on a broader ground' in the case of 1875-1 QBD 321, that a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing someone else, whether it be the contractor employed to do the work from which the danger arises or some independent person, to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from becoming wrongful".

(6) We may also refer to the following statement of the law in 28 Halsbury pp. 24 and 25 paras 22 and 23:

"22 Personal duty of the employer of an independent contractor. The classes of cases in which a personal duty exists at common law are not well defined. The two principal categories are where the work to be done involves either (1) special damage to others, or (2) danger on the highway.

Outside these categories of special dangers and highways, a master has been held liable to his servant for failure to take reasonable care to provide a safe place of work although he had engaged for this purpose contractors who, while generally competent, were negligent in the particular case; and a government department has been held liable where under statutory powers it employed to enter the plaintiff's land contractor who was negligent, 23. Special damages, examples of special dangers are dangerous building operations, the blasting of rock, work adjacent to gas pipes, use of a bensoline lamp which exploded on the highway, driving a cow and calf on the highway with only one driver, the deposit of dangerous paint scrapings, photography by magnesium flash and the use of an oxy-acetylene burner in an oil tank ship. The arranging of an aeroplane journey does not it seems, set in motion a thing dangerous in itself, such as would render an employer liable at common law for the act of an independent contractor".

"The principle is that if a man does work on or near another's property which involves danger to that property unless proper care is taken, he is liable to the owners of the property for damage resulting to it from the failure to take proper care, and is equally liable if, instead of doing the work himself, he procures another, whether agent, servant or otherwise, to do it for him. A like principle applies to work done in or near a highway involving danger to those who use it; see e. g. Holliday v. National Telephone Co., 1899-2-QB 392. In our opinion, the principles enunciated by Talbot J. are correct, and are applicable to the present case. To take up the photograph in the cinema with a flashlight was, on the evidence stated above, a dangerous operation in its intrinsic nature, involving the creation of fire and explosion on another person's premises, that is in the cinema the property of the cinema company. The appellants, in procuring this work to be performed by their contractors, the respondents, assumed an obligation to the cinema company which was, as we think, absolute, but which was at least an obligation to use reasonable precautions, to see that no damage resulted to the cinema company from these dangerous operations; that obligation they could not delegate by employing the respondents as independent contractors, but they were liable in this regard for the respondent's acts. For the damage actually caused the appellants were accordingly liable in law to the cinema company, and are entitled to claim and recover from the respondents damages for their breach of contract or negligence in performing their contract to take the photographs.

The learned Judge has found for the respondents because he has held (founding himself on the words of Lord Watson in Dalton v. Angus, (1881) 6 AC 740 that the work to be done by the respondents for the appellants was not necessarily attended with risk. It was work which, as a general rule, would seem to be of quite a harmless nature. But, with respect, he is ignoring the special rules which apply to extra hazardous or dangerous operations. Even of these it may be predicated that if carefully and skilfully performed, no harm will follow; as instances of such operations may be given those of removing support from adjoining houses, doing dangerous work on the highway, or creating fire or explosion; hence it may be said, in one sense, that such operations are not necessarily attended with risk. But the rule of liability for independent contractors' acts attaches to these operations, because they are inherently dangerous, and hence are done at the principal employer's peril".