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"18. The use of word "may" or "shall" is not conclusive. Whether the provision is merely directory or mandatory, was examined by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in a judgement reported as (2007) 8 SCC 338 (Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of U.P.), wherein it has been held that whether the provision is directory or mandatory is required to be decided by ascertaining the intention of the Legislature and not by looking at the language in which the provision is clothed. The Court must examine the scheme of the Act, purpose and object underlying the provision, consequences likely to ensue or inconvenience likely to result if the provision is read one way or the other and many more considerations relevant to the issue.........."

16. In Kamleshwar Sharma's case (supra), the Court held that the absence of provision for consequence in case of non-compliance with the requirements prescribed would indicate directory nature despite use of word "shall". The Court held as under:-

"23- In State of Mysore versus V.K. Kangan, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2190, the Supreme Court held that in determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, one must look into the subject- matter and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. It was held that, no doubt, all laws are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on those who come within its purview but it does not follow that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-maker. The said intention has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other.

17. The time limit to do an act falls broadly in two categories; one, when an obligation is cast on a party or a litigant to take an action within the time prescribed, such cases will be like the cases to file statement of defence under the Code of Civil Procedure. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 and later in Kailash v. Nanhku and others, (2005) 4 SCC 480, the Supreme Court held that keeping in view the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure introduced by way of amendment in the year 1999, the use of the word "shall" in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. The use of the word "shall" is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure WA-880-2018

20. Another set of cases is where the time limit is not for the party to perform but for a public Authority to conclude the proceedings. Where a provision of law lays down a period within which the public body should perform any function, that provision is merely directory and not mandatory. In Dr. Ram Singh Saini v. Dr. H.N. Bhargava, (1975) 4 SCC 676, the Supreme Court laid down the law as under:-

"4. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that the statute is directory and not mandatory, that in any case the statute is beyond the rule-making power conferred by section 31(aa). A number of decisions were relied upon in support of the submission that where a provision of law lays down a period within which a public body should perform any function, that provision is merely directory and not mandatory. The question whether a particular provision of a statute is directory or mandatory might well arise in a case where merely a period is specified for performing a duty but the consequences of not performing the duty within that period are not mentioned. In this case clearly the statute provides for the contingency of the duty not being performed within the period fixed by the statute and the consequence thereof. This proceeds on the basis that if the post is not filled within a year from the date of the nomination by the Selection Committee the post should be readvertised. So unless the post is readvertised and an appointment is made from among those persons who apply in response to the readvertisement the appointment cannot be said to be valid. Though the reason for the delay WA-880-2018