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8. Sri Nooty Rama Mohan Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned orders passed by the learned Chief Judge in allowing the applications filed by the respondents herein under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 43 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 suffer from incurable legal infirmities. The learned counsel contends that the learned Chief Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain and order the applications to condone the delay of more than thirty days in preferring the original petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The learned counsel contended that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 as the same are liable to be treated to have been impliedly excluded, since Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has provided for the period of limitation within which an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has to be taken out. It is contended that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 itself is a self-contained code. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 regulates the exercise of the discretion in the matter of condonation of delay by a competent court for a period of thirty days only "but not thereafter". In the circumstances, it is contended that the competent court of jurisdiction, for the good reasons, in an appropriate case may condone the delay of thirty days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and, under no circumstances, the court can condone the delay of more than thirty days in filing such petitions.

21. The Supreme Court in M/s. Popular Construction Co. (supra) laid down that the language of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 in clear terms excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a proceeding tinder Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The Supreme Court observed that "the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an Award is absolute and un-extendable by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act." it is explained that had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5."

22. But adverting to the language of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the Supreme Court laid emphasis on the crucial words in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the crucial words are "but not thereafter" are used in the proviso to Sub-section (3). In the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that this phrase "would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act," Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

23. The Supreme Court authoritatively laid down the law in M/s. Popular Construction Co. (supra) and declared that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the application challenging the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Hanuman Prasad & Brothers (supra) is an authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings before the court regarding making the award a rule of the court under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The decision is not an authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.