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8. The defendant contends that in a claim for prompt dower under Mahomedan law, a previous demand and refusal by the plain, tiff is a part of the plaintiff's cause of action. A dower debt is one of those obligations in which a creditor has to seek his debtor and not the debtor his creditor and if a valid and proper demand has not been made antecedent to the suit the action is bound to fail for want of a cause of action. The defendant further contends that in a case where prompt dower is not fixed by agreement under custom and has got to be fixed by Court no valid and proper demand can be made till the amount is fixed and therefore an action would not lie at all for the recovery of prompt dower and a dower therefore in such a case must be taken to be a deferred dower. Alternatively, he contends that a plaintiff must, before raising the action, fix up a bona fide and reasonable amount as her prompt dower and demand the same before filing a suit to recover it and an exaggerated demand embracing the entire amount of dower can never be a valid demand for a claim of half the amount of dower which later on the plaintiff decides to bring in Court. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that dower debt is like any other money, a debt with a promise to pay an demand, and in a case like this the demand is not an essential part of a cause of action. An action for recovery of debt would lie without making a previous demand. The basic principles which govern these contentions have been the subject of discussion by high judicial authority. In a Full Bench decision in Nawab Bahadoor Jung Khan v. Mt. Uzeez Begum (1843-46) S.D.N.W.P. 180 (F.B.) the nature of prompt dower is explained as follows:

12. The cases in Nawab Bahadoor Jung Khan v. Mt. Uzeez Begum (1843-46) S.D.N.W.P. 180 (F.B.), Mt. Mulleeka v. Mt. Jumeela ('73) I.A. Sup. Vol. 135 and Ranee Khajoo-roon-nissa v. Ranee Rayees-oon-nissa ('74-75) 2 I.A. 235, referred to above, were cases in which the wives were suing for their dowers and the question for consideration in the cases was whether their claim was barred by limitation on the language of the statute of limitation of those days, namely 12 years from the date of the cause of action. In Ameer-oon-nissa v. Moorad-oon-nissa (1854-57) 6 M.I.A. 211 the heir-at-law was suing the widow who had taken possession of the estate after the death of the husband in lieu of her dower and the possession of the widow was in lieu of her entire dower and there was no question of prompt dower involved in it. The precise question which is now before us, namely whether in an action for recovery of prompt dower where it has not been specified under an agreement or by a custom, a previous demand is or is not a part of the cause of action, was not before the Court and was not decided. And so far as the question of limitation in relation to demand is concerned, the matter is now governed by Article 103, Limitation Act. It gives effect to the principles laid down in the above rulings. In In re Brown's Estate (1893) 2 Ch. D. 300 at p. 304 Chitty J. observed as follows:
19. It is obvious to us that when Sir Shah Sulaiman is speaking of the right being lost after consummation he is speaking of the loss of right as a defence to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights and he did not mean in this passage to hold that the right was lost as a basis for an independent suit for recovery of her dower money, but as Sir Wazir has strongly pressed for our consideration this matter we propose to take a little more detailed notice of it. There is some conflict among Mahomedan jurists as to the right of a Mahomedan wife to insist on the payment of her prompt dower as a defence to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights after consummation has once taken place. In a Full Bench case of this Court in Abdul Kadir v. Salima ('86) 8 All. 149 Mahmood J. in delivering his well-known judgment which was adopted by the Full Bench has accepted the view of those jurists who lay down that after consummation of marriage a wife cannot resist a, suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the plea of non-payment of her prompt dower money. The actual dictum of Mahmood J. is in the following words:
23. The learned Judge then refers to that passage in Hedaya where it is said that it is the wife's right that she may deny herself to her husband until she received the dower and so on. It seems to us that under Mahomedan law consummation of marriage cannot possibly have the effect of making the prompt dower as deferred and the wife has an absolute right to bring an action for the recovery of prompt dower even after consummation whenever she chooses to do so. There remains now the question as to the amount of dower which should be treated as prompt and be allowed to the plaintiff in the present suit. The rule for the guidance of the Court in this matter is stated in Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan law, Edn. 11, at p. 221, para. 221(2) in the following words: