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or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of marriage with another woman with adultery.

or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards."

17. Confirmation of decree for dissolution by District Judge. -- Every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.

5. Mrs. Desai, Mrs. Agnes and Mr. Bagaria appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs have contended that the grounds available to the husbands and wives under Section 10 of the Act are discriminatory. Whereas a husband can claim divorce merely by proving that his wife has been guilty of adultery, the wife is not given a similar right. She is required to prove that her husband is guilty of incestuous adultery or bigamy with adultery or marriage with another woman, with adultery or adultery coupled with cruelly or, adultery coupled with desertion. They have further contended that wives, who arc governed by the Act, arc also discriminated vis-a-vis wives governed by other statues such as (i) Hindi Marriage Act, 1955 (ii) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, (iii) The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, (iv) The Special Marriage Act, 1954, and (v) The Foreign Marriage Act, 1959. Whereas the aforesaid enactments have provided larger rights to the wives to claim divorce, the same is denied to wives who are governed by the present Act. Aforesaid provisions of 'the Act' are, therefore, violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. It is further contended that the legal effect Of Section 10 is to compel wives who are cruelly treated or arc deserted to continue to live as the wife of a man she hates. Such a life will be a sub-human life without dignity and personal liberty and is, therefore, violative of Article 21 Of the Constitution.

22. In "Swapna Ghosh v. Sadananda Ghosh, (SB), the Calcutta High Court held, as under:

"3. To start with, under Section 10 of the Act, while the husband is entitled to a dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery, the wife is not so entitled unless she proves that the husband's adultery is incestuous or is coupled with cruelty or bigamy or desertion. If the husband is entitled to dissolution on the ground of adultery simpliciter on the part of the wife, but the wife is not so entitled unless some other matrimonial fault is also found to be superadded, then it is difficult id understand as to why this provision shall not be held to be discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and thus to be ultra vires Article 15 of the Constitution countermanding any discrimination on such ground..... Then again, under the Divorce Act, Christian spouses are not entitled to dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty or desertion, but are only entitled to judicial separation under Section 22 which shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa et thoro, that is separation only from "bed and board", whereunder matrimonial bond remains undissolved. But spouses married under the Special Marriage Act, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain spouses governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Zoroastrian spouses governed by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. Muslim wives under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 are entitled to dissolution of marriage, and not merely judicial separation, on those, grounds. Are we then discriminating against Christian spouses and that too, on the ground of their being Christian by Religion and thus violating the mandate of Article 15 interdicting discrimination on the ground of Religion only?"

35. Let us now examine the impugned provisions of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act in the light of the observations contained in the various Judgments cited above. We have already reproduced the relevant provisions of Section 10. The first part of the Section is in respect of a right of a husband to obtain divorce. All that is required of him is to prove that his wife has since the solemnisation of the marriage been guilty of adultery. Hence, adultery by itself is made a ground for divorce as far as husbands belonging to the Christian community are concerned. Now let us see how the wife is placed vis-a-vis the husband for claiming the very same relief, Provision, in this regard is made in the later part of the Section. As far as the ground of adultery is concerned, the same by itself is not sufficient to grant her a divorce. Adultery has to be incestuous adultery. Adultery has to be accompanied with bigamy. Adultery has to be accompanied by marriage with another woman. Adultery has to be coupled with cruelty or with desertion without reasonable excuse and that too for a period of two years or upwards. A question which arises for consideration is, whether there are just and sufficient grounds to make the above classification which places the Christian women to a disadvantageous position as compared to their husbands. Are there any grounds at all which can justify the discrimination. Can the discrimination be justified because the wives belong to the weaker sex. Can it be justified in order to establish the superiority of husbands over the wives. Is it merely in order to ensure that the wife is not treated equally with the husband. In our judgment, the aforesaid discrimination which is meted out to the wife, is wholly unreasonable. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality before law. The same mandates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Is this the equality that the State has been able to offer to Christian wives as per the mandate contained in the above Article. Is this the equal protection of taw which the State has envisaged and has conferred on the Christian wives as compared to those conferred on Christian husbands. The answer to these questions can be only one, 'No'.