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"23. Section 147 of NI Act begins with a non obstante clause and such clause is being used in a provision to communicate that the provision shall prevail despite anything to the contrary in any other or different legal provisions. So, in light of the compass provided, a dispute in the nature of complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, can be settied by way of compromise irrespective of any other legislation including Cr.P.C. in general and Section 320 (1)(2) OR (6) of the Cr.P.C. in particular. The scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C. deals mainly with procedural aspects; but it simultaneously crystallizes certain enforceable rights and obligation. So this provision has an element of substantive legislation and therefore, it can be said that the scheme of Section 320 docs not lay down only procedure; but still, the status of the scheme remains under a general law of procedure and as per the accepted proposition of law, the special law would prevail over general law. It is not necessary to enlist the authorities propounding this proposition of law available on this point. But for the sake of convenience, I would like to quote what the Apex Court has stated in the case of Municipal Corporation, Indore v. Ratnaprabha reported in AIR 1977 SC 308 where the Apex Court was dealing with similar principle and proposition of law of interpretation while dealing with the language of non obstante clause on the question of construction, it has been observed that:-

24(ii). In this connection I would like to quote the well accepted proposition of law emerging from various observations made by the Apex Court in different decisions as a gist of the principle and it can be summarised that, "When a special law or a statute is applicable to a particular subject, then the same would prevail over a general law with regard to the very subject, is the accepted principle in the field of interpretation of statute."

The operation or effect of a general Act may be curtailed by special Act even if a general Act contains a non obstante clause. But here is not a case where the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C. would come in the way in recording the compromise or 1n compounding the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. On the contrary provisions of Section 147 of NI Act though starts with a son obstante clause, is an affirmative enactment and this is possible to infer from the scheme that has overriding effect on the intention of legislature reflected in Section 320 Cr.P.C.

11. So far as CrPC is concerned, Section 320 deals with offences which are compoundable, either by the parties without the leave of the court or by the parties but only with the leave of the court. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 enumerates the offences which are compoundable without the leave of the court, while sub-section (2) of the said section specifies the offences which are coms: undable with the leave of the court.

12. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is in the nature of an enabling provision which provides for the compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act, thereby serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-section (9) of Section 320 CrPC which states that "No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section", A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under Jaws other than the Penal Code also cannot be compounded, However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special Jaw, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.

18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. There is also some support for the apprehensions raised by the learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque bounce cases are indeed being compromised or settled by way of compounding, albeit during the later stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery. The problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute, R/CR.MA/18712/2020 ORDER furthermore, the written submissions filed on behalf of the learned Attorney General have stressed on the fact that unlike Section 320 CrPC, Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides no explicit guidance as to what stage compounding can or cannot be done and whether compounding can be done at the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the court. The Guidelines:-