Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

34. Without further ado, the plea of the petitioner that the wrong committed by the respondents herein is "continuing" in nature, cannot be countenanced in law. Reference in this regard can be made to a recent case titled S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah8, in which the Supreme Court has comprehensively dealt with the issue of limitation in civil contempt petitions and what constitutes a "continuing wrong/breach/offence". The relevant observations are reproduced hereinunder: -

"...56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a "continuing wrong/breach/offence" to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase actually means but 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764 CONT.CAS(C) 13/2020 KUMAR VATS Signing Date:18.03.2025 16:50:02 would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a "continuing wrong/breach/offence"

ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of "continuing wrong/breach/offence" is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach."

78. The order on the writ petition directed the appellant to effect mutation in the revenue records in favour of the first respondent, in accordance with the final decree. The direction for mutation having been issued on 05th March, 2009, the appellant had a period of 2 (two) months therefrom to effect such mutation, as stipulated by the Writ Rules, which we shall assume the appellant failed or neglected to comply without just reason. From 04th May, 2009, i.e., the starting point for the limitation period for initiation of contempt action to commence, till 10th February, 2014, i.e., the date of the filing of the contempt petition, the appellant failed to effect mutation, as ordered by the Single Judge. Could it be said that every day thereafter that the appellant did not effect mutation gave rise to a fresh cause of action so as to constitute a "continuing wrong/breach/offence"? To our minds, the answer is a clear and unequivocal 'NO'. Upon application of the test laid down by this Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (supra) and M. th Siddiq (supra), it is evident that when, by 04 May, 2009, the appellant failed to implement the direction of the High Court, the act of disobedience was complete as on that date itself. Every day thenceforth, the name of the first respondent continued to be absent from the revenue records but such absence could not be characterised as the injury or wrongful act itself; it was merely the damage which flowed from the standalone act of breach committed by the appellant - that of not effecting the mutation. The injury was not repetitive or in other words, did not arise de die in diem, but rather, it was the effect of the injury which continued till the date the first respondent presented the contempt petition on 10th February, 2014. ..."