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(i) that an interim injunction is against a person and not against the property;
(ii) relying upon Sewa Singh Vs. R.S. Malhotra AIR 2004 Delhi 152, it is contended that specific performance of an Agreement to Sell entered into by the vendor in violation of an interim injunction of the Court should be granted, subject to the interim injunction being vacated; it is argued that upon the demise of the husband of the respondent/defendant, the interim injunction stands vacated and now there is no such impediment to the grant of the relief of specific performance. Relying on Yeshoda Rani Vs. Maneesh Kumar 67 (1997) DLT 340 (DB), it is contended that the respondent/defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong;
(iii) that appeal is a continuance of the suit and the relief which could have been granted in suit can also be granted in the appeal taking note of the subsequent event of the vacation of the interim injunction on account whereof the relief of specific performance has been declined in the suit;
(iv) relying on Kusuma Dei Vs. Malati Bewa AIR 1969 Orissa 195 and Pranakrushna Vs. Umakanta Panda AIR 1989 Orissa 148, it is argued that an Agreement to Sell in violation of an interim injunction is voidable at the instance of the purchaser and not at the instance of the seller who has acted in violation of the interim order;

28. The contention of the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the decree for specific performance should have been granted, subject to the outcome of the other suit, is incomprehensible. Reliance on judgments where specific performance was granted subject to the grant of permissions requisite/necessary for sale, is misconceived. The restrictions in law or in perpetual lease of land, prohibiting alienation without prior permission, have in Vishwa Nath Sharma Vs. Shyam Shanker Goela (2007) 10 SCC 595, K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. Vs. Alliance Ministries 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 17 and Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit Vs. Ramesh Chander (2010) 14 SCC 596 been held to be not a bar for entering into the Agreement to Sell, only after execution of which the permission can be sought/applied for. However an interim injunction of a Court, restraining a person from dispossessing the person in possession of the property or from alienating, encumbering or parting with possession of the property in any manner whatsoever, stands on a different footing and is an express bar to the very entering into of the argument and decreeing a suit for specific performance subject to the outcome of the interim injunction would clearly be a case of the Court becoming privy in violation of the interim order in another proceeding. It is only the Court which has granted the injunction which is competent to permit such suit for specific performance to be pursued.

36. I have wondered, why the appellant/plaintiff, though aware prior to the impugned judgment, of the injunction operating against sale, did not file an application in the suit filed by the husband of the respondent/defendant for impleadment or for directions for permitting specific performance in his favour, subject to the ultimate decision in that suit. That would have been a natural thing to have been done by the appellant/plaintiff, if his conduct had been bona fide. On the contrary, the appellant/plaintiff continued to press for specific performance of the entire Agreement and as per which Agreement, not only was the Sale Deed to be executed by the respondent/defendant in favour of the appellant/plaintiff but possession of the property also to be delivered to the appellant/plaintiff against payment by the appellant/plaintiff of the balance sale consideration and both of which were not possible in view of the interim injunction order. The appellant/plaintiff at that time did not state that upon learning of the injunction order, he was willing to purchase the property and pay the balance sale consideration subject to the outcome in the suit filed by the husband of the respondent/defendant. In my view, the appellant/plaintiff ought to have at that stage shown his willingness to perform his part of the Agreement by taking such a stand and which he did not do and which axiomatically means that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the Agreement to Sell without the respondent/defendant performing entire part of her Agreement and which she could not be asked to perform owing to the interim injunction in the other suit.