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16. The decision in CIT v. Straw-Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. has a persuasive value, so far as this court is concerned. It is not a binding judicial pronouncement or precedent. It is open to us to dissent from the decision if we find that its reasoning or the material part thereof is not convincing. The question, however, is whether we should look at the matter as if it has fallen for decision for the first time and and proceed to ascertain the true meaning of the word "paper" occurring in item 16 of the Sixth Schedule and merely because another view can possibly be taken, we should readily dissent from the decision. Two considerations are relevant while examining the question. First, it is a settled legal position that if two interpretations of a taxing provision are possible, the interpretation which is favourable to the assessee should be accepted and that which is favourable to the Revenue should be discarded. In the instant case, since one High Court has taken a possible view which is favourable to the assessee, even if another possible view favourable to the Revenue can be adopted, such futile exercise may be avoided, for, ultimately, the view in favour of the assessee might have to be taken. Secondly, in income-tax matters, which are governed by an all-India statute, when there is a decision of another High Court on the interpretation of a statutory provision, it would be a wise judicial policy and practice not to take a different view (whatever one's own view may be), barring, of course, certain exceptions, like where the decision is sub silentio, per incuriam, obiter dicta or based on a concession or takes a view which it is impossible to arrive at or there is another view in the field or there is a subsequent amendment of the statute or reversal or implied overruling of the decision by a higher court or some such or similar infirmity is manifestly perceivable in the decision. Such practice or policy is followed in income-tax matters by the Bombay High Court since a long time, as is evident from the decisions in Maneklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. v. CIT [1953] 24 ITR 375 and CIT v. Chimanlal J. Dalal & Co. [1965] 57 ITR 285. This High Court is an offspring of the Bombay High Court and there is nothing to show that the policy or practice followed in the Bombay High Court has been consciously departed from by this High Court and there is nothing to show that the policy or practice followed in the Bombay High Court has been consciously departed from by this High Court. On the contrary, in CIT v. Garden Silk Weaving Factory [1975] 101 ITR 658 (Guj), while dealing with an argument to the effect that there being a decision of the Bombay High Court, on the point, there, under consideration, the view expressed in the said decision should be accepted, even if it does not appeal to the court, on the principle of comity of judicial decisions and in the interest of the assessees of the two adjoining States, it was observed by a Division Bench of this court that it would have been inclined to accept the submission provided there were no other views in the filed. In that case it was found that two other High Courts had taken the view other than that which was preferred by the Bombay High Court and that, under those circumstances, it was not incumbent on its to accept the view of the Bombay High Court. Similar view is expressed in another Division Bench decision of this court in J. D. Patel v. Union of India [1975] 16 GLR 1083. It was a case which had arisen under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It was a case which had arisen under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Reference was made in the said decision to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Maneklal Chunilal & Sons [1953] 24 ITR 375 and Chimanlal J. Dalal & Co. [1965] 57 ITR 285 and it was held that on the salutary principle which the Bombay High Court had followed since loan and which had been affirmed in a number of tax matters, in a case where there is only one interpretation enunciated by a High Court in respect of a provision of a taxing statute, another High Court must ordinarily accept that view of the interpretation of a section or provision of a taxing statute which is an all India statute, as a matter of practice and policy. The Division Bench observed, in terms, that it was in respectful agreement with this salutary practice and policy in the interest of uniformity and consistency in matters of application of a taxing statute, so as to avoid the challenged of discrimination in the application and administration of tax matters. It would thus appear that it has been the consistent practice and policy of the Bombay High Court followed by this High Court that except in exceptional cases, such as those referred to earlier, if one High Court has interpreted the provision or section of a taxing statute, which is an all India statute, and there is no other view in the field, this High Court should ordinarily accept that view in the interest of comity of judicial decisions and consistency in matters of application of a taxing statute. Following the said practice and policy, we would hold, along with the Punjab and Haryana High Court, that straw-board is covered by the term "paper" occurring in item 16 of the Sixth Schedule and that, therefore, the assessee is entitled to the benefit of deduction under s. 80I. Strong reliance was, however, placed on behalf of the Revenue on two decisions of the Supreme Court, one in the context of a taxing statute and the other in the context of the essential commodities legislation, and it was urged that those decisions had the effect of impliedly overruling the decision in CIT v. Straw-Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1975] 98 ITR 78 (P & H) and that, therefore, we would not be justified in taking the same view as in that case.