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42. The question then arises as to what exactly is the scope of the Constitutional limitation against the control of personal liberty, such as the "freedom of speech and of the press," by the Government of the State or of the Union. That the fundamental right of the "freedom of speech and expression" guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution can also be legislated upon by the States or the Union Government, oannot be denied, for Article 19(2) itself specifically lays down the limits or reservations within which such legislation upon the said right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution can be enacted. The question then is what exaetly is the interpretation that has to be put upon the scope and implications of the reservations contained in Article 19(2) of the Constitution so far as tbe fundamental right of "freedom of speech and expression" is concerned. It is a well-known fact that, even in the United States of America, notwithstanding the passage of the first amendment to the Constitution, the Alien and Seditions Acts of 1798 and the Espionage Act of 1917 were enacted by the Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States held these Acts to be valid, though these were wartime legislations. In times of peace, however, the same Court has held that any legislation which controls the "freedom of speech and of the press'' will amount to due process of law, when it was a proper exercise of the police power of the State; and tbe proper exercise of the police power it has been held, would be whenever the Supreme Court of the United States finds a paramount social interest involved. In the case of seditious libel, i.e., libel on Government as distinguished from libel on private individuals, in the early stages, the Supreme Court of the United States thought that, when words directly urge or cause unlawful acts, a paramount social interest was involved and any legislation by the State controlling the expression of such words would be legal. However, at a later stage, the same Court thought that when the words might have an indirect or remote tendency to cause unlawful acts, social control of freedom of speech and of the press would be in the proper exercise of the police power vested in the State, by reason of the due process of law clause in the fourteenth amendment. Still later, the same Supreme Court of the United States has held that, when there is a clear and present danger that words will cause unlawful acts, the exercise of police power under the due process of law clause is allowed and the control of freedom of speech and of the press is sustainable as legal and legitimate. Though this seems to be the latest position so far as the Supreme Court of the United States is concerned, still according to H.E. Willis, the well-known author of the Constitutional Law of the United States, the position of the law, so fair as the "clear and present danger" test is concerned, has been left in some obscurity by some of the later decisions. But this much seems to be clear, so far as the American Constitution is concerned, that the test of the remote and indirect tendency to cause unlawful acts cannot be the test of the Constitutionality of the social control of the right of "freedom of speech end of the press". But in the ulti-