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8. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that the applicant had colluded with the 1st respondent/ appellant and fraudulently brought the sale deed with a view to defeat the right of the 2nd respondent. He would further submit that the said purchase was only for Rs.1,61,000/- whereas the 2nd respondent had agreed to purchase the said property for a sum of Rs.6,51,200/-. He would further submit in his argument that the applicant has not come to court with clean hands and he is not entitled for any relief as sought for. Moreover the said property was purchased during the pendency of the suit on 27.02.2008 and the applicant being a purchaser 'pendente lite' is not at all entitled to any relief, much less the impleadment in the appeal. He would further submit in his argument that the applicant did not apply before the lower court when the case was pending before the lower court for impleadment and he had applied before the appellate court in order to delay and defeat the proceedings in the appeal. He would further submit in his argument that the injunction ordered before the lower court in I.A.No.21 of 2008 was defeated and in utter disobedience, the 1st respondent had sold the property in order to defeat the rights of the 2nd respondent, if possible. He would draw the attention of the court to a judgment of this court made in between (V.K. ELAYALWAR vs. N. GOVINDARAJULU & OTHERS) reported in 1993 (2) LW 430 to the effect that the parties who purchased the properties even movable properties cannot be considered as bonafide purchaser when they have no knowledge of the pending proceedings. He would also quote the judgment that the lispendens would apply to those cases and such transfer cannot be considered as a bonafide transfer. He would again refer a judgment of this court reported in 2000 (1) MLJ 349 to the proposition that the purchaser of property 'pendente lite' cannot contend that he is the bonafide purchaser for value without notice or to say that he was not aware of the proceedings and had no notice of the pendency of the proceedings. He would again submit in his argument that the 1st respondent who was dare enough to sell the property during the existence of the injunction order against him cannot plead that the applicant had purchased the property without knowing the proceedings of the court. He would further submit in his argument that the subsequent purchase during the 'pendente lite' is not necessary or proper party to the suit as per the judgment of our Apex court reported in 1996 5 SCC 539 in between (SARVINDER SINGH VS. DALIP SINGH AND OTHERS). He would further submit in his argument that similar view was taken in yet another judgment of Apex court made in (2007) 6 MLJ 1757 (SC) in between (SUNIL GUPTA vs. KIRAN GIRHOTRA AND OTHERS). He would also submit in his argument that the applicant who has not chosen to file an application before the lower court during the said period, as he is stated to have purchased the suit property had not applied during the pendency of the suit, but had come forward with this application in the appellate stage, is not permissible in law as per the judgment of our Apex court in AIR 1976 SC 2538 in between the (THE STATE OF KERALA vs. THE GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY, MADRAS). For the similar proposition of law he would also draw the attention of the court to a judgment of the Apex court made in (NARAYAN BHAGWANTRAO GOSAVI BALAJ vs. GOPAL VINAYAK GOSAV & OTHERS) reported in AIR 1960 SC 100. He would again submit in his argument that the applicant who is claiming to be the purchaser during the pendency of the suit has no right in the suit or in the appeal as it was denied by the Apex court of India in the judgment made in between (DHANNA SINGH & OTHERS vs. BALJINDER KAUR & OTHERS) as reported in AIR 1997 SC 3720. Therefore, he would submit that when the applicant has no right to participate in the trial or leading in evidence nothing survives at the stage of the appeal since the 1st respondent/appellant had already preferred appeal and there is no necessity for the applicant herein to be impleaded as a necessary party to the appeal. He would also submit in his argument that the impleadment even if ordered the party will be deemed to have been impleaded from the date of the impleadment and the suit claimed as against him can be considered as barred under the law of limitation and therefore no necessity for the applicant being impleaded as a necessary party. The applicant being a subsequent purchaser admittedly during the pendency of the suit has no right nor any grievance over the decree, since his rights were to be decided only on the date of the suit and not thereafter. He would also submit that the doctrine of 'lispendens' would certainly operate and apart from that the injunction order passed by the lower court was flouted by the 1st respondent with the active collusion with the applicant and fraud has been committed against the order of the court and therefore the relief sought for by the applicant cannot be ordered. Therefore the application filed by him for impleadment has to be dismissed.

" 5. The undisputed fact is that in the plaint the plaintiff-respondent had already sought for a reliefs of injunction of alienation, yet the alienation came to be made. Apart from the doctrine of lis pendense under Section 52 of the T.P.Act, the subsequent purchaser does not get any right to lead to any evidence, as he stepped into the shoes of the first defendant, who had given up the right to lead evidence. In view of these circumstances, he does not get any right to lead any evidence."

According to the said judgment when there was an injunction order any alienation has been made in violation of the said order, certainly the said transfer was affected by the doctrine of 'lispendens' also. It has been categorically laid down by yet another judgment of Hon'ble Apex court reported in between (SARVINDER SINGH V. DALIP SINGH AND OTHERS) reported in (1996) 5 SCC 539 as follows:

As per the aforesaid dictum laid down by Hon'ble Apex court, we could see that a transferee of a property during the pendency of the proceeding is not a necessary party to the said proceedings. According to the judgments laid down supra, this court could see that the purchaser 'pendente lite' is not necessary party as he has not completed the two tests laid down in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court cited by the learned counsel for the applicant. The presence of subsequent purchaser during the pendency of the suit was considered as not a necessary party because he had collusively purchased the property during the pendency of the suit and without the authority of the court. Admittedly, the applicant did not apply for permission or authority of the court for buying the said property. Per contra, he had purchased the said property in violation of the injunction order passed by the lower court. Therefore the rights accrued through the said document to the applicant need not be considered in this suit. Therefore, the right accrued to the applicant cannot be considered as semblance of any right or title over the said property and it cannot be considered as a right against the parties to the appeal as per the dictum of our Apex court. In these circumstances, it could be seen that the 1st respondent had collusively created the document for a lesser price when a larger price has been contracted in between the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent by virtue of the suit agreement. It is clear that there was no bonafide on the part of the applicant in getting the sale deed from the 1st respondent. Therefore the judgments of the Apex court as cited supra by the learned counsel for the applicant are not applicable to the present case. Moreover the judgment of the Patna High court as well as the Calcutta High court as cited by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent are also not suitable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Since the transaction had by the 1st respondent with the applicant during the pendency of the suit was hit by the doctrine of 'lispendens' as well as in violation of the injunction order passed by the lower court regarding the alienation of the properties during the pendency of the suit, I could find that the applicant is not a necessary party to be impleaded in the appeal.