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37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen part within specified areas in Oudh and part outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

19. The judgment in Nasiruddin case clearly holds that the place where an order is passed by an appellate authority or revisional authority, as the case may be, the same would confer jurisdiction on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, it has been held that even where a part of the cause of action arose, it would be open to the litigant, who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. This principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra). But before we examine the decision in Kusum Ingot, we may refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (supra) and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Kishore Rungta and Ors. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (supra) and of the Delhi High Court in Indian Institute of Technology v. P.C.Jain and Ors.(supra) and that of the Madras High Court in ORJ Electronics Oxides Ltd. v. Customs, Excise and Service Tax (supra).

12. The said decision proceeded on the basis that part of the cause of action may arise at the forum where the appellate order or the revisional order is sourced.

If, thus, a cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, the petitioner shall be the dominus litis. Indisputably, if this set of reasoning is to be accepted, the impugned judgment as also the decision rendered in Bombay Snuff would not be correct.

Before dilating on the said proposition of law it may be noticed that the decision of a tribunal would be binding on the assessing authority. If the situs of the Appellate Tribunal should be considered to be the determinative factor, a decision rendered by the tribunal shall be binding on all the authorities exercising its jurisdiction under the said tribunal.

13. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litis, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or courts or tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the High Court at Bombay.