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2) Whether although the opposite party has been directed to be released on bail by the learned Single Judge, it is a final order disposing of a case and thus is covered by Section 362 of the Code?

8. It is so obvious in the scheme of the Code that a person who is arrested ans released on bail when he applies under Section 439(1) of the Code before the Sessions Judge can be subject to an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 439. When the opposite party was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, application under Section 439(2) was filed and the same was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court. The order of the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the application afresh, thus, was an order refusing bail and the only remedy to the opposite party in such a case, was to move for bail before the High Court under Section 439(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not by way of a revision, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code. Since specific provision for seeking bail in the Code was available, to the opposite party, he could not invoke this Court's revisional or inherent jurisdiction under Sections 307, 401 or 482 of the Code. By labelling the application thus as an application in revision against the order of the Sessions Judge and /or an application invoking inherent power of the Court, the opposite party could not change the nature of the application. It was obviously an application for bail and for no other relief to the opposite party. Even though the learned Single Judge disposed of the application of the opposite party as one purportedly under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 482 thereof, the order granting bail to the opposite party has been one under Section 439(1) of the Code and thus the instant application under Section 439(2) is maintainable. The nature of the order of the learned Single Judge being one granting bail to the opposite party, it is difficult to accept the same as a final order under Section 362 of the Code and to exclude the Court's inherent power to review the case. Even though the order is one ostensibly made under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code or under 482 of the Code it is not a final order disposing of any case.

It follows, thus, from the above that the Court's revisional power shall not be available to revise interlocutory order yet its inherent power can be used if it is held by the Court that continuance of the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court or it is necessary for securing the ends of justice to interfere.
21. Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla's case (Supra) dealing with Section 11 of the Special Courts Act (1979) and Sections 397 and 482 of the Code has said in its majority judgment as follows:

28. On the facts of the case as above, it is difficult to comprehend why the accused-opposite party invoked this Court's jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 /482 of the Code. If it was not a deliberate attempt to escape, the consequence of refusal of the prayer for bail by the City Sessions Judge, why then instead of moving an application for bail, the accused-opposite party moved the application for revision of the order of the City Sessions Judge and/or interference in exercise of its inherent power with the order of the City Sessions Judge. Limited revisional jurisdiction of the Court could not and cannot be extended to an order to grant bail. If at all this Court, in exercise of its revisional power could examine the legality or propriety of the order of the City Sessions Judge, it could at best set right the wrong and set aside the order and issue such directions that were necessary to meet the ends of justice. Direction by the learned Single Judge to grant bail to the accused-opposite party resulted in restoration of the order granting bail dated 30.5.96 and thus amounted to setting aside the order of the Division Bench of the Court under which the order of the City Sessions Judge dated 30.5.96 was set aside and he was directed to hear the application for bail afresh. Judicial discipline demands that a Judge sitting alone respects the Division Bench Order of the Court and if he has any view of his own which conflicts with the view of the Division Bench, refers the matter to the Chief Justice of the Court for placing it before a larger Bench. It is indeed of utmost importance and is followed by all Courts in India as a Rule of Prudence and Propriety that a Single Judge accepts the verdict of the Division Bench of two Judges and Bench of two Judge accepts the verdict of a larger Bench. In other words, larger the quorum, more is the binding effect. (See, Union of India v. Raghubir Singh--. Assuming for a moment, that the application under Section 397/401/482 of the Code in this Court was maintainable and since such application was required to be placed under the aforementioned Rule, before a Single Judge and accordingly it was placed before the learned Judge, having seen, in course of hearing, that he was required to examine some of the findings and directions of the Division Bench of the Court, he would have taken the golden path of referring the matter to the Chief Justice of the Court for placing the matter before an appropriate Bench. Learned Single Judge has commented upon the Division Bench Order as follows:

And in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohatgi (Supra) it is said:-
It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the orders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against witnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the secope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section 482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.