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19. "The date of order" has been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India as meaning the date of communication or knowledge actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed. Relevant extract of the said judgment paragraphs 4 to 14 are being quoted below:
4. By order dated 20.02,2001, the Bar Council of India directed the appellant to surrender the STD booth, presumable forming an opining that whosoever might be conducting the STD booth actually, yet the booth was allotted in the name of the appellant and the surrender would bring to an end the controversy so far as the appellant's conduct as an advocate is concerned. The appellant sought some time for surrendering the licence of the telephone booth because certain dues were to be realised from customers which would be difficult to do in the event of the business being suddenly discontinued. As the appellant failed to surrender the STD booth, the Bar Council of India passed an order dated 31.03.2001 advising the State Bar Council of India to delete the name of the appellant from the rolls of advocates. On 26.04.2001, the appellant surrendered the booth. The appellant sought for a review of the order of the Bar Council of India based on the subsequent event of the telephone booth having being surrendered. Vide order dated 26.08.2001 the Bar Council of India has rejected the petition for review on the ground that the same was barred by time. As against the order dated 26.08.2001 the appellant has filed appeal by special leave. As against the order dated 31.03.2001 the appellant has filed a statutory appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act 1961 and also an appeal by special leave.

10. An identical point came up for the consideration of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer . Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 contemplates an application seeking reference to the court being filed within six months from the date of Collector's award. It was held that "the date of the award" cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office. It must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position, then placing a literal and mechanical construction on the words "the date of award" occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate. It is fair and just that a decision is communicated to the party whose rights will ultimately be affected or who will be affected by the decision. The knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the party affected by such a decision, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus, construed, the making of the award cannot consist merely of the physical act of writing an award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. A literal or mechanical way of construing the words "from the date of the Collector's award" was held to be unreasonable. The Court assigned a practical meaning to the expression by holding it as meaning the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively.

14. How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved by expected to exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The words "the date of that order", therefore, mean and must be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.

20. Following the said interpretation, inevitable conclusion is that for commencement of the period of limitation for filing Appeal under Section 7I of 1952 Act as per procedure prescribed under 1997 Rules, " within 60 days from the date of order" has to be construed "as within sixty days from the date of communication or knowledge of the order, actually or constructively." After expiry of period of sixty days from the date of communication or knowledge of order in case Appeal is to be filed, then sufficient cause will have to be furnished, for condonation of delay in preferring the Appeal, however, this further period cannot be extended for more than sixty days.