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16. The learned counsel for OP-3 argued that this Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and no deficiency in service had been made out against the OPs. He further argued that the complainant did not fall within the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1) of the Act and that the complainant lacked locus standi to initiate the case. On merits, he argued that the insured had approached the insurers through OP-2, a professional broker, for obtaining an Erection All Risks (EAR) Policy for its refinery project at Cuddalore. After evaluating various quotes, the offer of OP-1 was accepted, and the policy was issued upon receipt of premium. He argued that the original policy was issued for the period 10.12.2008 to 09.12.2011 and was thereafter extended from time to time until 09.09.2015 at the request of the insured. The learned counsel asserted that OP-3 was only a co-insurer with a limited share while OP-1 was the lead insurer. Therefore, OP-3 adopted the reply and documents filed by OP-1. He further argued that the policy and its extensions were granted upon receipt of premium and at the request of the insured through OP-2. The insured had knowingly entered into the insurance contract and continued for several years and, therefore, could not subsequently resile from the contract and seek refund of premium. He contended that the objections now raised by the complainant regarding proposal form, policy terms, sub-limits and other conditions were never raised during the subsistence of the policy and were merely afterthoughts. He argued that the insured, being a large corporate entity assisted by a professional broker, could not claim ignorance of the policy terms including coverage under the EAR policy. The insured had repeatedly sought extensions of the policy and had paid the required premium each time, thereby clearly accepting the terms of insurance. He relied on the correspondence between the parties demonstrating that the insured was aware of the policy terms and had even sought increase in the sum insured and extensions of the policy. The insurance coverage continued without any break from 2008 to 2015 and the insurers undertook the risk throughout the period. He argued that the allegations regarding backdating of the policy, non-issuance of policy terms and fraudulent conduct were false and unsupported by any material. He further argued that the grievance raised by the complainant after expiry of the policy was clearly an attempt to reopen a concluded contract of insurance. The issues relating to sub-limits, exclusions and other terms were part of the policy from the beginning and had been accepted by the insured. The complainant cannot seek to rewrite the terms of the policy or demand refund of premium after having enjoyed the benefit of the insurance. He asserted that the complaint was devoid of merit and deserved to be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

18. The learned counsel for OP-5 argued that the complaint was not maintainable and this Commission lacked jurisdiction as the dispute did not fall within the ambit of the Act, 1986. No deficiency in service was made out and the Complainant did not fall within the definition of „consumer‟ and the proceedings initiated were without jurisdiction. He asserted that OP-5 was initially a co-insurer with a 12.5% share along with OP-1, the lead insurer, and adopted the reply and annexures filed by OP-1 to the extent of its share. OP-5 remained a co-insurer only up to 09.03.2013 and did not participate in the subsequent extensions. Therefore, the allegations pertaining to the period after 09.03.2013 were not relevant so far as OP-5 was concerned.

B. Whether the extension of Erection All Risks Insurance (EARI) Policy and issuance of the subsequent EARI Policies during the period of total cessation of work at the Complainant‟s refinery project constituted deficiency in service on the part of the OPs? C. Is the Complainant entitled to refund of the premium amount along with consequential reliefs as prayed?

22. The OPs raised a preliminary objection that the Complainant is a large commercial entity engaged in the business of petroleum refining and that the insurance policy in question was obtained for a commercial project. It was therefore, contended that the Complainant does not fall within the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and consequently the present complaint is not maintainable. We have considered the said objection and arguments advanced by both the parties. The grievance raised in the present complaint pertains to the alleged deficiency in insurance service rendered by the OPs, particularly with regard to the extension of the Erection All Risks Insurance (EARI) Policy and collection of premium during the period when, according to the Complainant, there was no subsisting erection risk. The issue as to whether procurement of an insurance policy by a commercial entity would fall within the definition of "consumer" is no longer res integra. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 409, has held that procurement of insurance for protection of assets or risks, even in the course of business, does not amount to hiring services for a "commercial purpose", when insurance is obtained for indemnification and not for profit generation. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

23. In light of the above authoritative pronouncement, it is clear that the procurement of an insurance policy for safeguarding assets or risks cannot be treated as a service hired for a commercial purpose, since the object of insurance is indemnification against loss and not generation of profit. In the present case, the Complainant had obtained the EARI policy to cover risks arising during erection, testing and commissioning of its refinery project. The service hired was thus, an insurance service intended to indemnify potential losses arising out of uncertain events during the project period. Accordingly, applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, we are of the considered view that the Complainant falls within the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the present complaint is maintainable before this Commission. The first issue is, therefore, decided in favour of the Complainant.