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6) In view of the said complaint, the learned Magistrate recorded the verification statement of Respondent No.2 and then proceeded to pass the Order of issue process/summons under Section 384 r/w. 34 of I.P.C. against the Petitioners. According to the Petitioners, the entire complaint is misconceived and cannot stand against them. Hence, these Petitions.

7) Mr. Amit Desai, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that, the offence punishable under Section 384 of I.P.C. for which the process has been issued, was neither alleged against the Petitioners nor made out from the text of the complaint. However, by way of the impugned Order, the learned Magistrate directed to issue the process for the said offence of Section 384 of IPC. He submitted that, the Accused Nos.4 to 21 are mainly the Board of Directors of the Accused Nos.1 to 3-Companies. But the concept of vicarious P.H. Jayani 904 WP2125.2004 WITH 2268.2004.doc liability does not apply to criminal law except when the statute provided for the same. This aspect is also ignored in this case by the learned Magistrate before issuing the process. Therefore, the impugned Order as well as the aforesaid complaint are liable to be quashed and set-aside.

8) Ms. Newton, the learned APP, on the other hand, opposed the Petitions strongly and submitted that, there is sufficient material against the Petitioners which clearly show that they have committed the offence of Section 384 of I.P.C., through their employees. Therefore, the impugned Order cannot be rated as illegal. Insofar as the affidavit-in-reply is concerned, the Respondent No.2 has mainly reiterated what he has narrated in the complaint.

9) Admittedly, the offence under Section 384 of I.P.C., was not alleged against the Petitioners in the subject complaint. Said Section 384 reads as under :-

"384. Punishment for extortion.--Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."

10) Considering the text of the complaint and the impugned Order, it appears that the learned Magistrate directed to issue process/summons under Section 384 of I.P.C. mainly for the reason P.H. Jayani 904 WP2125.2004 WITH 2268.2004.doc that two persons i.e., Mr. Jadhav and Mr. More went to the office of the Respondent No.2 and demanded the said bills amount. But when the Respondent took the exception, the duo allegedly threatened him that their master is a big person and he can do anything to him and his family. However, there is no whisper in the complaint as to how Petitioners were responsible for the said act of Mr. Jadhav and Mr. More. It is not the case that Petitioners had instructed said Mr. Jadhav and Mr. More to go to the Respondent No.2 and demand the bills amount by threatening him as above. Moreover, there is no material on record showing that Mr. Jadhav and Mr. More were indeed the employees of the Petitioners. There is nothing to point out that the Petitioners were directly responsible for issuing the aforesaid telephone connections in the name of the Respondent No.2 and charge him with the said bills amount. The complaint mentions that the Accused Nos.4 to 21 are are responsible for day to day affairs of the accused companies. Nevertheless, no allegation has been made as against any of the Petitioner that they had anything to deal with personally either in discharge of their statutory or official duties. In the backdrop, in my opinion, absolutely there are no ingredients in the complaint to make out the offence of Section 384 read with 34 of I.P.C. as against the Petitioners.

11) Considering the narration in the complaint, mainly, the P.H. Jayani 904 WP2125.2004 WITH 2268.2004.doc grievance of the Respondent No.2 was against the accused companies i.e., Accused Nos.1 to 3. Admittedly, the rest of Petitioners were Directors of the accused companies. Therefore, the said Petitioners cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged offence of Section 384 of I.P.C. In this context, a useful reference can be made to the decision in S.K. Alagh v/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 19 has held that, "... . If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself." In the another cited decision between Maksud Sayed v/s. State of Gujarat and Other2 also it has been held that, vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute.