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graduate qualifications, and after giving the said preference the claims of less qualified candidates who are also eligible for appointment would be considered. Such preference is not conditional or limited." On an interpretation of the relevant rule read with the above memorandum, the PSC following the decision of the High Court in Writ Petition No' 2568 of 1982 (supra) treated the post-graduates as a class and gave them preferential treatment by selecting those post-graduates who secured more than the qualifying marks in the open category and since they were available in sufficient number, graduates were kept out of selection. In the case of reserved categories also post-graduates to the extent they were available and had secured the qualifying marks for empnelment were selected and only where sufficient number of such post- graduates were not available graduates were selected in accordance with merit and placed below them in the list. This procedure was followed by the PSC in view of the guidelines laid down in the judgment of the High Court in the aforesaid writ petition. In that case, the learned Single Judge in the High Court held as under :

Writ Appeal No. 475 of 1987 was dismissed on August 25, 1987 on the ground that the Single Judge's order was implemented. The State Government's S.L.P. No. 13035 of 1987 was also dismissed on November 26, 1990.

The Supreme Court's decision relied on by the learned Single Judge is the case of Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1971] Supp. SCR 549. Following the above dictum of the learned Single Judge of the High Court when the selections were made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 6/88, the PSC followed the procedure indicated by the High Court and prepared the Select List. This was once again put into issue by the graduates who were left out of selection in several applications filed in the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad. A two-member Bench of the Tribunal heard this group of applications and by its judgment and order dated September 19, 1991 quashed the Select List prepared by the PSC on the following line of reasoning :

It will appear from the above facts that the PSC had earlier interpreted and applied the relevant rule as opined by the Tribunal but the same was struck down by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2568 of 1982 holding that such a procedure would defeat the very object of preferential treatment. The learned Single Judge directed that the post-graduates should be treated as a preferred class and so long as post- graduates who had secured the minimum qualifying marks were available, they were to given preference to graduates notwithstanding the fact that the latter may have secured higher percentage of marks in the written as well as oral test/interview. Only when qualified post-graduates are not available could the names of the graduates be entered in the Select List on the basis of their inter-se merit. Since this decision of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was holding the field at the relevant point of time when selections were made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 6/88, the PSC followed the procedure outlined by the learned Single Judge and notwithstanding the fact that certain graduates had secured higher percentage of marks than post- graduates, the latter were selected in preference to the former and only in the reserved category where sufficient number of post-graduates were not available graduates were empanelled on the basis of their inter-se merit and placed below the post-graduates. Once again the PSC got entangled in litigation and, as pointed out above, the tribunal by the impugned judgment took a view contrary to the one taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and upset the Select List. So far as the applicants of O.A. Nos. 1736 to 1739 of 1990 were concerned the tribunal upheld the decision of the PSC not to call them for oral test/interview since they had not secured the qualifying marks in the written test. Their contention that notwithstanding their having failed to secure the qualifying marks in the written test, they should have been called for oral test/interviews and thereafter the total marks secured both in the written test and the oral test should have been compared with the total marks secured by others, did not find favour with the tribunal. The tribunal, therefore, dismissed their applications with no order as to costs. They too have approached this Court in appeal. It is clear from the above that two views are canvassed on the true interpretation of the relevant rule. The view urged by the post-graduates is that in implementing the rule of preference in the matter of direct recruitment the PSC should first exhaust candidates having post-graduate qualifications if they have secured the minimum qualifying marks and if they are not available in sufficient number, then and then only, graduates should be selected on merits from among those who have secure the minimum qualifying marks and above. Learned counsel for the postgraduates submitted that if the rule is not so implemented the very purpose of granting preference to post-graduates will be lost as it will virtually boil down to a ridiculously low figure and the object of cadre-strengthening will not be achieved. This view found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2568 of 1982 as mentioned earlier. The rival view canvassed by the learned counsel for the non-preference candidates is that the preference rule can come into play only where two candidates have secured equal marks in which case the candidate possessing post-gaduate qualification will be preferred if the other candidate does not possess that qualification but not otherwise, that is, not if a graduate has secured higher number of marks than the post-graduate. In other words everything being equal between two candidates, the scale will tilt in favour of a post-graduate if the other candidate is merely a graduate. This view has found favour with the tribunal which is impugned before us. For us the question is which of the two views is correct. We may at this stage notice one further contention urged on behalf of the appellants and that is that it was not legally correct for the Tribunal to have upset the law already settled by the High Court which the PSC had applied in finalising the selection since it was a decision rendered much before (i) the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, came into force and (ii) the Tribunal was constituted thereunder. Alternatively it was urged that even if two views were reasonably possible on the construction of the relevant rule, the Tribunal should not have upset the selection made on the construction earlier placed by the High Court.

It was emphasised on behalf of the post-graduates that the use of the expression after in paragraphs 2 and 3 makes it clear beyond any manner of doubt that the intention of the authorities was to treat post-graduates as a class and to consider them first and only thereafter could ordinary graduates aspire to seek entry into the higher post. It is indeed true that under paragraph 2 of the memo it was directed that the fist of eligible candidates with post-graduation qualification. shall be first considered......... and only after such a list is considered the cases of ordinary candidates shall be considered; albeit on the basis of merit and ability. The language of this paragraph leaves no manner of doubt that the turn of ordinary graduates for consideration came only after the ha of oh post-graduates was settled. The order in which the cases of post-graduates and ordinary graduates will be considered is made clear in this paragraph. But paragraph 3 of the Memo says that the expression 'preference shall be given' occurring in Note 1 would mean that other things e.g. passing of prescribed tests, maintaining merit, suitability, fitness, etc., being equal, preference shall be given to holders of post-graduates qualifications. The latter part of this paragraph adds 'after giving the said preference', the claims of less qualified candidates would be considered. This would mean that after a comparative study is undertaken those postgraduates who are found entitled to preference would be first promoted and thereafter cases of less qualified candidates would be considered. The combined reading of paragraphs 2 and 3 gives the impression that cases of post-graduates found entitled to promotion had to be first considered and only after their absorption would it be permissible to consider the claims of ordinary graduates i.e. less qualified candidates. This method of grant of preference in the matter of promotion was changed by GOMs No. 180 of 1983 probably because it was causing avoidable hardships. Similar changes were introduced in the rules concerning other engineering services also. By this amendment instead of granting preference to post-graduates in the matter of promotion under the aforesaid Memo, the 9th vacancy in 9 vacancies was earmarked for a post-graduate. We fail to see how such a provision granting preference to post-graduates on the basis of their higher educational qualification be said to conflict. with the equality clause when the post- graduates constitute a separate class. More of it later. The interpretation on Note 1 has to be placed in background of the said historical fact. It is at the same time necessary to remember that so far as the PSC is concerned it placed the interpretation now placed by the Tribunal under the impugned order till it was disapproved by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2568/82. In doing so the High Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Md. Usman's case (supra). That was a case in which both UDCs and LDCs were placed in one class for the purpose of recruitment as Grade II Sub- Regiwam The rule was, therefore challenged as violative of Article 14 on the ground that unequals were treated as equals. The second question was whether the recruitments were made in accordance with the relevant rule. The High Court answered the latter contention in the affirmative but struck down the rule on the first ground. In appeal this Court reversed the High Court's decision holding that there was no violation of Article 14 in clubbing UDCs and LDCs for the purpose of recruitment to Grade IT Sub-Registrars. Now the rule that prescribed the qualification for the said post also provided that preference shall be given to persons who, in addition to the prescribed qualification, possess a degree in law of University in the state or an equivalent qualification. In that case these persons who were entitled to preference were considered separately and recruited first and only thereafter others were recruited, as in the present case. This Court found this method for recruitment by transfer to 'the most reasonable one'. Those observations support the contention put-forward by the post-graduates and were relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the High Court in support of the view taken by him. The Tribunal has referred to this decision but has not expressed itself on the applicability or otherwise of the said view. The matter may be looked at from another view-point. The word preference' as understood in ordinary parlance means to preferring or choosing as more desirable, favouring or conferring a prior right. What then is the purpose and object sought to be achieved by the insertion of the preference clause in the rule? There is no doubt that preference was sought to be granted under Note 1 to post- graduates in the larger, interest of the administration. How would the interest. of the administration be served by granting preference to post-graduates? It is obvious that it was thought that on account of their higher mental equipment the quality of performance that the State will receive from highly qualified engineers would be better and of a high order. In other words the State considered it necessary to strengthen the engineering service by recruiting postgraduates to the extent available so that the State may benefit from their higher educational qualifications and better performance. If this was the objective surely it would not be realised unless post- graduates are treated as a class and given preference on block over the graduates. Since sufficient number of post- graduates may not be available from the feeder channels and even if available cannot be promoted out of turn without causing heart burns, it was thought desirable to resort to such large scale recruitment directly from the open market. The underlying idea of the Memo dated 13th October, 1978 was the same but certain difficulties were felt in resorting to enforcement of the preference clause at the promotion stage and that is why the second part came to be inserted in Note I but no such difficulty would be experienced in strengthening the cadre through direct recruitment. But then it was said what was the need for the PSC to hold the written test by inviting applications from graduates and subjecting them to test? That was for the reason that there was no guarantee that sufficient number of post-graduates would qualify for selection and appointment. But if the preference rule were to be implemented as held by the Tribunal it would apply only where the post-graduate and graduate candidates have secured the same number of marks. If the rule so implemented is carried to its logical end it would ultimately resolve a tie only at the last rung of the ladder because ties at higher levels would be resolved by a post- graduate being followed by a graduate in the select list. The question of elimination would really arise at the last placement in the list and hence the real purpose of the preference rule would not be served. That is why this Court in Md. Usman's case (supra) approved of this method of recruitment as most reasonable. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the employer preferring a candidate with higher qualification for service. It is well settled by a catenation of decisions that classification on the basis of higher educational qualification to achieve higher administrative efficiency is permissible under our constitutional scheme. See Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185; State of J & K v. Trilok Nath Koosa, [1974] 1 SCC 19; Md. Sujat Ali v. Union of India, [1975] 3 SCC 76; Roop Chand v. DDA, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 116; V. Markandaya v. State of A.P., [1989] 3 SCC 191 and Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University, [1990] 3 SCC 23. We, therefore, do not agree that treating post-graduates as a class and giving them preference in this manner is violative of Articles 14/16 of the Constitution. We also do not see any vice in the relevant rule and in Note 1 as amended in 1983.