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3)(a) Where a person is arrested under this section and the officer making the arrest, or the officer in charge of the police station before whom the arrested person is produced, has reasonable grounds to believe that the detention of the arrested person for a period longer than twenty-four hours from the time of arrest (excluding the time required to take the arrested person from the place of arrest to the Court of a Judicial Magistrate) is necessary, by reason that-
(i) the person is likely to continue the design to commit, or is likely to commit the cognizable offence referred to in Sub-section (1) after his release; and

11. So far as the challenge to the said provision based on Article 14 is concerned,, it is also not possible for us to accept the said contention of Shri Rane. In our view, the power conferred by Sub-section (3) of Section 151 is neither unbridled nor arbitrary. In Balraj Madhok v. The Union of India [1967] A.I.R. Delhi 31, Hegde C.J. (as he then was) had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 151 of the Code, While analysing the said provision, it 'was observed therein (at p. 32):

The power given under this provision impinges on one of the important liberties of an individual. Hence it is necessary that in exercise of that power, there should be strict compliance with the requirements of the law.... What is required under Section 151 of the Code is that the officer concerned must know that the person to be arrested is designing to commit a cognizable offence. An 'apprehension' that he may commit an offence is not sufficient under that provision. Apprehension is not the same thing as knowledge, The former is a mere feeling. Latter is definite conclusion. Further, even mere knowledge that the person concerned would endanger peace or tranquility need not result in a cognizable offence, Again, the possibility of the commission of a cognizable offence does not mean that he is designing to commit such an offence. Lastly, it is not said that it appeared to the officer concerned that the commission of the offence could not be otherwise prevented-.
That was the position even when Sub-section (3) was not on the statute book. Therefore, even for arresting a person for a period of twenty four hours, the .section as it originally stood, provided enough guidelines. In Sub-section (3) as amended by Maharashtra Act, an obligation is cast upon the police officer making arrest to produce the person before the Judicial Magistrate if the detention of the arrested person for a period longer than 24 hours from the time of his arrest is necessary. Before such an application could be made to the Judicial Magistrate, the Police Officer must have reasonable grounds to believe. The expression '.reasonable grounds to believe" is a strong expression. It does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Police Officer. The belief must be held in good faith. It cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently, the reasons for the belief should have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of belief and should not be extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. Such a belief will have to be founded on reasonable grounds. Therefore, these grounds must exist in the record. The powers of the Judicial Magistrate to grant remand are also circumscribed by the provisions of Sub-section (3) itself. Initially it must be shown that the person is likely to continue the design to commit, or is likely to commit, the cognizable offence referred to in Sub-section (1) and that the circumstances of the case are such that his being at large is likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The expression "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" has received a specific connotation. There is a distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order'. These words are judicially interpreted. As to what is the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' is explained by the Supreme Court in various decisions. It will be enough if a reference is made to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P. wherein earlier decisions are referred to and relied upon. It is well-settled that when the words and phrases previously interpreted by the Courts are used by the legislature in the later enactment, then in the absence of anything to the contrary, there is a presumption that the legislature intended to convey by their use the same meaning which the Court had already given to them. This presumption will be stronger where these words have received a settled meaning by series of decisions of the highest Court of the country. This is more so in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India which lays down that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on everybody. Thus, the expressions used in Section 151(3) have a clear, definite and precise meaning and that the legislature must be taken to have intended that they should be understood in that sense only and no other. Therefore, it cannot be said that the expression used is in any way vague. Further, for passing an order of remand the Judicial Magistrate must be satisfied that the person is likely to continue the design to commit or is likely to commit, the cognizable offence referred to in Sub-section (1) after his release and that the circumstances of the case are such that his being at large is likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The word 'and' is normally conjunctive. Thus, the conditions laid down in Sub-section (3)(a)(i) and (ii) must co-exist. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, the order of remand cannot be passed. Before passing the order of remand, strict compliance with the provisions of law is necessary. The mere possibility of committing a cognizable offence does not mean that the person is designing to commit the offence. The words used are "the design to commit" and "likely to commit" the cognizable offence. It is something more than mere possibility. The design should be qua the person who is sought to be arrested and not generally. As observed by the Orissa High Court in Prahalad Panda v. Province of Orissa : -

15. So far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, the learned Public Prosecutors found it difficult to support the orders passed by the Police Officers or the Judicial Magistrate. Even otherwise if the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate are read between the lines, it is quite obvious that the orders of remand have been passed by the Judicial Magistrate without any application of mind for the mere asking of it. There was no material on record to show that the petitioners had any design to commit any cognizable offence. There is also no material to show that they were likely to commit any such offences; or their being at large was likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The power under Section 151 cannot be exercised only because a person believes in a particular ideology, or belongs to an action group or has resorted to hunger strike. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu and Kashmir : -