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10. The Secondary School Code 2002, (hereinafter called as the "S.S. Code") itself is not a statutory document but is in the nature of an executive directions or guidelines. The provisions of grant-in-aid in the S.S. Code are merely executive instructions and do not have force of law and are in the nature of administrative instructions without any statutory force of law. Such a view was taken by the Supreme Court in the State of Assam v. Ajitkumar Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1196. This view was even expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha, AIR 1973 SC 588. Giving the orders passed by the authorities under the S.S. Code, a character of enforceability, the Supreme Court held that these directions were enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India though the S.S. Code is non-

"7. Though notice was issued to the respondents and served, the writ petitioner in the PIL (Maharashtra Rajya Shikshan Sansthan Mahamandal) has not entered appearance. Though the State and its authorities did not challenge the order of the High Court, they supported the appellants and contended before us that the Order dated 16-5-2006 was validly made. It was submitted that the Secondary Education Code governed the starting of secondary and higher secondary schools; and that permission was granted to 1495 schools by Orders dated 16-5-2006, only after the District Level Committees recommended grant of permission to those schools, after verifying that the applicants fulfilled the requirements of the Education Code; that all permissions were on "permanent no-grant basis" without any financial assistance and appropriate conditions were imposed to ensure that the schools were properly run; that the decision in Gramvikas Mandal required the master plan to be prepared only for Marathi medium schools and not for English medium or other non-marathi medium schools and not for English medium or other non-marathi medium schools and schools run by religious minorities; that the High Court had set aside the Order dated 16-5-2006 in regard to all 1495 schools, even though it related to a large number of schools which were not required to be covered by the master plan; and that the High Court had ignored the fact that its Aurangabad Bench had permitted the State Government to sanction schools on permanent unaided basis, even without the master plan, for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. it was also contended that the High Court could not have quashed the permission granted to the 1495 schools, without hearing them and without impleading them as parties to the writ petition.