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6. The scheme of Section 47 calls for a somewhat closer attention for its true construction. The word 'company' employed therein, as has already been noticed, means any body corporate and includes a firm or other associations of individuals, and Director in relation to the firm means a partner of that firm. Sub-section (1) creates a deeming legal fiction whereby every person, who is in charge of and/or responsible to the company for the conduct of its business becomes automatically guilty of the offence committed by such a company and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. No other overt act or direct commission of the offence by such a person is necessary barring the factum of being in charge of the company or responsible thereto for the conduct of its business. As already noticed, this is so by virtue of the deeming fiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 47 and one is inclined to refer to the famous dictum of East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. (1952) AC 109 at Pp. 132-133:--

8. Analysed as above, Section 47(1) spells out a deeming fiction of vicarious liability and a rule of evidence laying the burden of proof on persons in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.

9. Once it is held as above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner falls in its place and stands conclusively repelled. It is settled beyond cavil that rules of evidence and deeming fictions are not to be expressly spelt out and pleaded. They are matters which are for consideration and application in the course of the trial. To require that the complaint itself must plead a rule of evidence or, in terms, spell out a deeming fiction provided by the statute therein is an argument bordering on hyper technicality. One must always keep in mind the broader perspective that the administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than of form and should not be allowed to be obscured by pettifogging technicality. This aspect seems to be well covered if not wholly concluded by the recent Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Kripal Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1985 Pat LJR 271 : (1985 Cri LJ 1048). Therein also in the context of Section 14 of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme. 1952 it was argued that the petition of complaint must, in term, plead each and every relevant fact including the precise number of employees in the establishment. Repelling such a contention on principle and precedent, it was concluded by the Full Bench in the terms following : --

14. When closely viewed, Sub-section (2) is clearly indicative of the fact that it is both a rule of evidence and yet again a deeming fiction for vicarious culpability. Perhaps the one crucial aspect herein is the use of the word 'proved' in the earlier part of the subsection. It comes into play only at the stage of the availability of adequate proof that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of the principal or other officers of the company. The usual and the normal rule of criminal law is that the charge must be brought home directly to the offender. However, Sub-section (2) lightens the burden by providing that even if it is proved that the principal officers were guilty of consent, connivance or negligence with regard to the offence committed by the company, they would be within the net of culpability. This is effectuated by an express deeming fiction that if any of the aforesaid ingredients is established then the officials concerned will be held guilty of that offence and be punished accordingly. Sub-section (2) may truly come into play during the course of the trial and even at its conclusion when it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of the company's principal officials. Thus, the stringent rule in Sub-section (2) in a way provides a second line of defence for the prosecution. Even where the case set up is that the offence has been directly, wilfully or deliberately committed by the company and its officials but the same cannot be established to the hilt, this sub-section provides that such officer would still be guilty if the relatively lower culpability of even consent or mere connivance or neglect is laid at his door. This is probably and patently due to the difficulties of proving a charge beyond reasonable doubt in cases of vicarious liability for offences committed by legal and artificial persons as compared to natural persons. It bears repetition that this Sub-section (2) is a rule of evidence for apportioning guilt when consent, connivance or neglect is proved by its principal officer and a deeming fiction of guilt for vicarious Liability to the crimes committed by the company itself.

15. Now once it is held as above, it is well settled that a rule of evidence or a deeming fiction of the law are not to be pleaded as such. No principle warrants that either in a complaint or in a first information report the literal words of the statute must be incorporated or what is even important is that the rule of evidence with regard to burden of proof and a deeming fiction of guilt should be quoted at the foundational stage. Therefore, to require that the complaint or the first information report must inflexibly plead consent, connivance or negligence of the officers at the threshold stage is, to my mind, patently fallacious. Seen broadly, the deeming fiction is primarily one of evidence and proof and not of the literal formalities of pleading, which are foreign to the criminal law. Indeed, it must be noticed that in a particular case the prosecution charge may be one of direct, deliberate and wilful commission of the offence by the company and its officials. In such a situation, to require that they should plead at the outset that it was only by way of consent or connivance or neglect would be an absurdity and indeed, destructive or contrary to the case set up. Again, as has been noticed above, Sub-section (2) applies independently and notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), Therefore, to require that the pleading of consent, connivance or neglect must be incorporated even with regard to the guilt under Sub-section (1), which is absolute pertaining to the person in charge of and responsible to the company, is in a way rather more fallacious.