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On the same issue, in DTC v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 1, Delhi and Ors. 2002 II AD (Delhi) 112, it was held by this Court as hereafter:

13. It is Mr. Sabharwal's contention that this precedent would not be applicable because the court was considering the grant of full back wages and Section 17B of the I.D. Act had not been called into question. However, as I see it, since the above opinion has been expressed in the context of the Labour Court/Tribunal having granted reinstatement with fullback wages, the observations in Rajinder Kumar Kindra's case (supra) would apply a fortiori to all cases where this Section has been invoked. Furthermore, the right of an appeal has been taken away by an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, and Section 17B of the I.D. Act has been introduced. The legislature intended a finality in the determination of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and to impart he narrow interpretation advocated by Mr.Sabharwal would wholly emasculate the statute. Even where an appeal is permitted from a money decree the jural rule is that a stay against payment/deposit of the decretal amount should not be given. All the more so when a person's livelihood and his existence is at stake. If a workman's income from transitory work is tobe taken into consideration because the Section envisages only subsistence, the logical extension of the argument is that in all cases where subsistence allowance is to be granted, the alternative and other income of the delinquent workman/officer should also be investigated and then adjusted. Is the employer to be allowed to circumvent his liability to pay the subsistence allowance because the employee has an income from sources other than his salary. No such argument has as yet been advanced in service law, quite obviously because of its inherent absurdity. Section 17B of the I.D. Act is attracted as soon as it is stated on affidavit that the concerned workman has not been 'employed in any establishment.' The legislature could have simply stated that it is attracted only if the workman has had no earnings in the said period. Alternatively the legislature need not have specified that the employment should be in 'an undertaking', thereby leaving room for the Courts to construe the word 'employment' as synonymous with 'self-employment'. In the proviso to the Section instead of 'remuneration', the words 'earnings' or 'income' could have been employed. Apart from Rajinder Kumar Kindra's case (supra) it has been held in Taj Services Limited v. . Industrial Tribunal-1 and Ors. 2000-1-LLJ-198, that 'under the proviso to Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act what is required to be proved by the employer is that the workman had been employed in any establishment and had been receiving adequate remuneration from such employment. Being employed for remuneration in an establishment means employment under another employer. It is different from running one's own business or trade in order to remain alive to see the need of the litigation. Hence I accept the contention of the learned Counsel for workman that respondents 2, 4 and 10 cannot be denied the benefit under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that they are running their own business and are receiving profit from such business.' Although the question in M/s Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v. Sk. Anwar Basha and Ors. 1996-III-L.L.J. (Suppl.) 971 (H.C.) related to back wages which in the opinion of the Division Bench excluded 'employment for short periods in order to save himself from starvation', the reasoning would also apply a fortiori to the present case. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in K. Jayaraman v. Quilon Gas Service and Anr. 1995-II-L.L.J. 1150 has held that 'despite the counter affidavit, there is no acceptable evidence to hold that the appellant was employed in the garment making unit of his wife. Assuming that he was so employed there is hardly any evidence with regard to the adequacy of the remuneration which he had obtained from that concern. Even if it is assumed that the appellant was getting some income from auto-rickshaws as alleged in the counter-affidavit, it would not be sufficient to hold that the proviso to Section 17B is attracted,' Self-employment quite apparently is not in contemplation since the Section itself mentions 'employment in any establishment'.

17. In 2000 1 LLJ 1012 entitled Taj Services Limited v. Industrtial Tribunal - 1 and Ors. it has been held that:

6. Workmen can be denied the benefits under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act only when it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the workmen have been employed and have been receiving adequate remuneration during the period of pendency of the writ petition. In the case of workmen other than respondent Nos. 2, 4 & 10 there is no allegation by the management that they have been employed and have been receiving adequate remuneration during the pendency of the writ petition. Even in the case of the respondent Nos. 2, 4 & 10 the allegation is that they are running their own business but the said allegation is denied by the learned Counsel for the respondents. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, even if the survival of himself and his family, it will not disentitle the workman for the benefits under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Counsel for the respondents also contended that the proviso to Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act would be attracted only in the case of the employment under another employer and receiving adequate remuneration. I find force in the contention of the learned Counsel. As per Section 17B the workman is required to file an affidavit to the effect that he had not been 'employed in any establishment'. Hence under the proviso to Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act what is required to be proved by the employer is that the workman had been employed in any establishment and had been receiving adequate remuneration from such employment. Being employed for remuneration in an establishment means employment under another employer. It is different from running one's own business or trade in order to remain alive to see the end of the litigation. Hence I accept the contention of the learned Counsel for workmen that respondents 2, 4 and 10 cannot be denied the benefit under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that they are running their own business and are receiving profit from such business.

7. Management counsel have belaboured the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dena Bank 1 (supra) to the effect that the wages contemplated under Section 17B of the I.D. Act partake of the nature of a subsistence allowance and hence should not exceed the actual wages last drawn by the workman at that point of time when his employment was terminated. In the first place, this observation was made in the context of the payments made pursuant to orders under Section 17B of the I.D. Act being non-recoverable and non-adjustable. Secondly, the Court must endeavor to give a purposeful interpretation to a statutory provision, in conformity with its Objects. The only exception or limitation is where the language used is such that the only meaning extractable does not permit such an interpretation. Thus, if a subsistence allowance was intended to be given in Section 17B of the I.D. Act, it could have been easily stated so. A pedantic approach is always to be deprecated. In C.W.P. No. 2112 of 1999 it has been highlighted by Mr. Sabharwal himself that the workperson was a daily-wager and she was earning only Rs. 11/- and that the DDA would submit that it is these wages that should be granted to her. Even if Mr. Sabharwal's arguments were to be accepted, can this sum of Rs. 11/- be considered as a 'subsistence allowance'. This submission has strengthened my resolve and understanding that under Section 17B of the I.D. Act, the wages should not fall below the time when orders under the Section are to be passed, a moderation may reasonably be effected. It was his contention, however, that while minimum wages could be ordered in place of `last drawn wages' if these are below the minimum wages, once this is carried out there would be no further justification for ordering the payments under Section 17B of the I.D. Act to keep pace with the increase in the minimum wages, once this is carried out there would be no further justification for ordering the payments under Section 17B of the I.D. Act to keep pace with the increase in the minimum wages. To the contrary, Ms. Sunita Bhardwaj, who appears for the workmen drew attention to the enduring observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Crown Aluminium Works v. Their workmen 1958 (1) LJJ 1 to the effect that there is 'one principle which admits of no exceptions. No industry has a right to exist unless it is able to pay to its workmen at least a bare minimum wages. It is quire likely that in under-developed countries, where unemployment prevails on a very large scale, unorganized labour may be available on starvation wages, but the employment of labour on starvation wages cannot be encouraged or favored in a modern democratic welfare State.' Even though these observations were made whilst the Court was concerned with the fixation of a wage structure, they are of ubiquitous application. In Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, it has been observed that in so far as Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Ememption from Labour Laws) Act exempts and excludes the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act in relation to workmen employed in famine relief work and permits payment less than the Minimum Wages, it offends Article 23 of the Constitution and is ultra vires. Similar views have also been expressed in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. . On the strength of all these precedents it appears inevitable and inescapable that wherever wages are in contemplation, they cannot fall below the minimum wages, whether the inquiry is on wage fixation, fair wage or interim relief under Section 17B of the I.D. Act, or whatever.

10. The Apex Court had earlier opined in Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and Ors. 1986-II-LLJ-217, that the power to grant back wages was possessed and employed by the High Courts and the Supreme Court even prior to Section 17B of the I.D. Act, which therefore merely codified the law. The Hon'ble Court had observed that 'the conferment of a new jurisdiction can take effect only prospectively except when a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. Section 11-A plainly indicates its prospective operation. This is made clear in the proviso to the section when it says 'provided that in any proceeding under this Section'. This can only mean something relatable to a stage after the Section came into being. That is not the case with Section 17B. Here it is not the conferment of a new jurisdiction but the codification in statutory form of a right available to the workmen to get back wages when certain given conditions are satisfied. There are no words in the Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17B was introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object.' This further fortifies the view that the wages to be granted in this Section can be from the date of the Award especially since the 'Objects' of the amendment clearly indicate/specify so. In Regional Authority, Dena Bank and Anr. v. Ghanshyam JT 2001 (Suppl. 1) SC 229, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered its previous view in Dena Bank I (supra) and observed that 'the import of Section 17B admits of no doubt that Parliament intended that the workman should get the last drawn wages from the date of the Award till the challenge to the Award is finally decided'. On first principles, the Apex Court has held that Orders under Section 17B of the I.D. Act should commence with effect from the date of the Award, thus leaving no scope any longer for debate.