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3. Mr. Chatterji has contended the following points on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner -- (1) that it has not been shown that the plaintiff is not a casual money-lender, that is to say, the money-lending transactions of the pro forma defendant did not exceed Rs. 500 in the year; (2) that, the plaintiff being a registered money-lender under the Act, the suit has been wrongly dismissed by the Court below; (2a) Section 4 of the Act does not apply to this suit because in terms the bar applies to a person who has advanced a loan himself and, the plaintiff not being such a person, Section 4 had no application to his suit; (3) that the plaintiff is a 'holder in due course' under Section 9, Negotiable Instruments Act, and as such he was entitled to a decree; (4) two out of the four brothers mentioned as pro forma defendants had in fact been registered under the Money-Lenders Act in 1946, and, therefore, the suit by the plaintiff was not liable to be dismissed; and (5) that, in any view of the matter, the plaintiff was entitled to a refund of the consideration money.

On the 19th of July, 1939, under section 3 of the Bihar MonSy-Lende'rs Act, 1938 (Bihar Act III of 1938) the Governor of Bihar was pleased to exempt in all areas of the Chota-Nagpur Division a casual money-lender whose money-lending did not exceed the total amount of Rs. 500 in cash in any particular year. On the strength of this notification it is urged that the pro forma defendant was a casual money-lender within the meaning of that notification &, therefore, the plaintiff, in whose name the handnote was endorsed by the pro forma defendant, was entitled to maintain his suit and the bar of Section 4 did not apply to such a case. The answer to that question is that there is no material brought on the record to show that the pro forma defendant was a casual money-lender and that his money-lending business did not exceed Rs. 500/- a year. The plaintiff wants to take advantage of the exception, and it was for him, and not for the defendant, to have produced evidence to show that he was covered by the exception. Apart from this, it is established upon the plaintiff's own case that the pro forma defendant was registered as a firm under the Money-Lenders Act in 1950 (exhibit 5). If the pro forma defendant got itself registered as a firm in 1950, ft cannot be said, in the absence of any other material, that its money-lending business was within Rs. 500/-a year. The first contention, therefore, fails.

6. It is contended in the next place that, the plaintiff being a registered money-lender himself, the suit should not have been dismissed. It is said that his allegation in the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff is a registered money-lender has not been disputed in the written statement, and it must he taken, therefore, that the plaintiff is a registered money-lender and that, the plaintiff being the successor-in-interest of the pro forma defendant, it should be held that the bar of Section 4 did not affect his suit. Under Section 4 of the Money-Lenders Act, the money-lender who has advanced a loan must be registered on the date the loan was advanced and, if he was not then registered, he cannot bring a suit under that section. It does not matter in the least if the plaintiff was in fact a registered money-lender on that date. The loan was advanced not by the plaintiff, but by the pro forma defendant and the pro forma defendant was not a registered firm under the Money-Lenders Act on 10-1-1948, when the loan was advanced to the defendant. In my judgment, there is absolutely no merit in this contention also.

It is quite clear that in the present case the plaintiff, under the definition of 'money-lender' given in Section 2 (g), is a successor-in-interest of the money-lender who has advanced the loan. It is found that the pro forma defendant, who had advanced the loan, was not a registered money-lender on the date the loan was advanced and, therefore, the plaintiff, who brings a suit on the basis of that loan advanced by the pro forma defendant, cannot be heard to say that, although the person who advanced the loan was not registered, the plaintiff, haying been registered, was not bound by the provisions of that section. The plaintiff is the successor-in-interest of the pro forma defendant by assignment, and he cannot have a higher right than that of the pro forma defendant. It is true that the plaintiff himself had not advanced the loan, but, in my judgment, the bar of Section 4 will apply to him also because the plaintiff has stepped into the shoes of the pro forma defendant. If the contention made on behalf of the plaintiff is correct, then the provisions of Section 4 of the Act could be easily defeated by a money-lender, who is not registered as a money-lender under the Act, by endorsing the handnote on which money was lent in favour of a person who is a registered money-lender and, in my judgment that could not possibly have been the intention of the Legislature. I would hold therefore, that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, namely, the pro forma defendant, not being a registered money-lender on the date when the loan was advanced, the plaintiff, an assignee from that pro forma defendant, cannot maintain the suit. In my judgment, therefore, this contention must be rejected.