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36.3. In National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy, (2012) 2 SCC 506 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 908] , the jurisdiction of the District Consumer forum was challenged on the ground that there was an arbitration clause in the Agreement between the parties. It was contended that the provisions of the Seeds Act, 1966 would prevail over the Consumer Protection Act. Relevant extracts of the ruling are extracted hereinunder : (SCC pp. 532 & 534-35, paras 57, 62, 64 & 66)   "57. It can thus be said that in the context of farmers/growers and other consumers of seeds, the Seeds Act is a special legislation insofar as the provisions contained therein ensure that those engaged in agriculture and horticulture get quality seeds and any person who violates the provisions of the Act and/or the Rules is brought before the law and punished. However, there is no provision in that Act and the Rules framed thereunder for compensating the farmers, etc. who may suffer adversely due to loss of crop or deficient yield on account of defective seeds supplied by a person authorised to sell the seeds. That apart, there is nothing in the Seeds Act and the Rules which may give an indication that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act are not available to the farmers who are otherwise covered by the wide definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act. As a matter of fact, any attempt to exclude the farmers from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act by implication will make that Act vulnerable to an attack of unconstitutionality on the ground of discrimination and there is no reason why the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act should be so interpreted.

 

30. Later, this Court in Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), while dealing with the connotative expanse of the term "consumer" in the unamended form and the explanation added to the expression "Consumer" by an amendment, ruled that such explanation is clarificatory in nature and taking note of the explanation added by the amendment Act, 1993 extensively examined the definition of the term "consumer" as under:­   "11. Now coming back to the definition of the expression 'consumer' in Section 2(d), a consumer means insofar as is relevant for the purpose of this appeal, (i) a person who buys any goods for consideration; it is immaterial whether the consideration is paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or whether the payment of consideration is deferred; (ii) a person who uses such goods with the approval of the person who buys such goods for consideration; (iii) but does not include a person who buys such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The expression 'resale' is clear enough. Controversy has, however, arisen with respect to meaning of the expression "commercial purpose". It is also not defined in the Act. In the absence of a definition, we have to go by its ordinary meaning. 'Commercial' denotes "pertaining to commerce" (Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary); it means "connected with, or engaged in commerce; mercantile; having profit as the main aim" (Collins English Dictionary) whereas the word 'commerce' means "financial transactions especially buying and selling of merchandise, on a large scale" (Concise Oxford Dictionary). The National Commission appears to have been taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods "with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning profit" he will not be a 'consumer' within the meaning of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act. Broadly affirming the said view and more particularly with a view to obviate any confusion ­ the expression "large scale" is not a very precise expression ­ Parliament stepped in and added the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/ Amendment Act, 1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression "commercial purpose" ­ a case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others' work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for "commercial purpose" would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression 'consumer'. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self­employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a 'consumer'. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self­employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say. A person who purchases an auto­rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against this a person who purchases an auto­rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation flowing from the expressions "used by him", and "by means of self­employment" in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words "for the purpose of earning his livelihood" is explained and clarified by the other two sets of words.

 

and after a fair analysis of the definition "consumer" post­amendment 1993 finally held as under:

 
"21. We must, therefore, hold that:
(i) The explanation added by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act 50 of 1993 (replacing Ordinance 24 of 1993) with effect from 18­6­1993 is clarificatory in nature and applies to all pending proceedings.
 
(ii) Whether the purpose for which a person has bought goods is a "commercial purpose" within the meaning of the definition of expression 'consumer' in Section 2(d) of the Act is always a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
 
(iii) A person who buys goods and uses them himself, exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment is within the definition of the expression 'consumer'."
 

31. The exposition of law on the subject was further considered by this Court in Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and Others in which one of us (Rastogi, J.) was a member and the question arose for consideration was whether the purchase of flats for the purpose of providing accommodation to nurses employed by the Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust hospital qualifies a purchase of services for commercial purpose and whether the Hospital Trust was excluded from the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, 1986, this Court after revisiting the scheme of the Act, 1986 and taking note of the law of precedence in Laxmi Engineering Works (supra) of which a reference has been made and placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Paramount Digital Colour Lab and Others v. AGFA India Private Limited and Others held that a person whether or not a consumer or other activities meant for commercial purpose will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.