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7. Thereafter the complaint was tried and an issue was framed as to whether the petitioner had engaged in unfair labour practices within the meaning of Item 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of the said 1971 Act which issue was answered in the affirmative excepting Item 1(g). It was further held that the petitioner could not justify the termination of the services of the first respondent under letter dated 21st August, 1980. In the result, the final order was passed on 29th June, 1990 holding that the petitioner was indulging in unfair labour practices under Items 1(a), (b), (d), and (f) of Schedule IV of the said 1971 Act and the order of termination dated 21st August, 1980 was, therefore, set aside. The petitioner was directed to reinstate the first respondent within a period of three months from the date of the order with continuity of service with effect from 21st August, 1980 with full back wages and other consequential service benefits till the date of reinstatement. It may be stated that two complaints were filed. Shri D. Samuel who was working as a supervisor in the mechanical maintenance department had filed a Complaint (ULP) No. 111 of 1980 whereas the first respondent Shri Ramesh Kumbla who was working as a supervisor in the electrical maintenance department had filed a Complaint (ULP) No. 113 of 1980. Both the complaints were heard and disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 29th June, 1990. Identical reliefs were granted in both the complaints since the order of termination of service dated 21st August, 1980 in both the cases was held to be bad in law and set aside.

23. I have already referred to the decision of Rebello, J., in the companion Writ Petition No. 2596 of 1994 of Union Carbide (India) Ltd. v. D. Samuel & others, 1998(II) C.L.R. 736, where D. Samuel, who was working as a Maintenance Supervisor in the Mechanical Maintenance Department has been held not be a 'workman'. I will refer to the details of that since its facts are similar to the petitioner's case. Suffice it to say that whereas D. Samuel was working as a Supervisor in the Mechanical Maintenance Department, the first respondent was working as a Supervisor in the Electrical Maintenance Department. The last salary drawn by D. Samuel was Rs. 2590/- per month whereas the last salary drawn by the first respondent was Rs. 2715/ -. Pipe fitters and helpers were working under D. Samuel, whereas electricians and helpers were working under the first respondent. In D. Damuel's case, it was held that the evidence on record showed that D. Samuel was treated as a part of Management Staff which had a separate pension scheme and gratuity scheme. Same is the case before me. D. Samuel was delegated duties of recommending leaves, calling for requisition from stores and evaluating the work of employees below him. At the time of promotion, D. Samuel was informed that he was part of the Management and was liable to be transferred anywhere in the country. He participated in the various programmes organised by the Company for its Managerial Personnel. All these facts and attributes are present in the case before me. It was in these facts that it was held that D. Samuel was not a 'workman' and this Court reversed the concurrent findings recorded by the two authorities.

(iv) of Clause (s) of section 2 of the I.D. Act. When questioned as to whether the authorisation of over-time work or meal sanctioned by the first respondent was subject to approval by the higher authorities, Nijhawan denied the suggestion. The suggestion that Kumbla was not concerned with the planning in his Department has been denied by Nijhawan.

30. The evidence discussed above clearly shows that the first respondent was employed in a supervisory capacity and was drawing gross wages of Rs. 3214.60: Net Rs. 2194/-. The predominant nature of his work was supervisory and not technical. It is true that as a Supervisor he was required to do at times, the work himself because of its technical nature. But, in my view, that does not militate against the first respondent being employed primarily in a supervisory capacity as a Supervisor in the Electrical Maintenance Department. He had power to recommend leave and authorise over-time work and over-time free meal. He enjoyed certain special privileges and benefits under the Pension Scheme and the Gratuity Scheme framed by the petitioner Company, the benefits of which were not available to "workmen". The first respondent was deputed to attend the Key Managerial Programme and indeed, attended the same.

34. In the view that I have taken it must, therefore, follow that the complaint filed by the first respondent in the Labour Court was not maintainable since he was employed in a supervisory capacity and was drawing wages exceeding the prescribed limit under clause (iv) of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. He is therefore outside the purview of definition of a "workman" by virtue of his case falling under sub-Clause (iv) of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. 1 have mentioned above that, on identical facts, in the case of a co-workman D. Samuel, who was a Supervisor in the Mechanical Maintenance Department, this Court has taken a similar view, as is clear from 1998(II). C.L.R. 736. Whereas D. Samuel was a Supervisor in the Mechanical Maintenance Department, the first respondent was working as a Supervisor in the Electrical Maintenance Department. Their service conditions, predominant nature of their job, the supervision and control exercised by them, the privileges and perquisites enjoyed by them are almost identical. My attention has been invited to the details of the evidence in D. Samuel's case and the points of similarity in the two cases where identical evidence was led. That is an additional circumstance for coming to the conclusion that the first respondent is not a "workman" within the meaning of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.