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17. As such these appeals were listed before us on the 19 th September, 2016. This was at a stage when the paper books were ready and the appeals were ripe for hearing. On this date, Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma, learned counsel (appearing for Sajjan Kumar in Crl.A.No.1099/2013) prayed for an adjournment of the case for the reason that he wished to file an application seeking recusal from hearing of these matters by one of us (my learned Brother, P.S. Teji, J.). In as much as the appearance on 10th September, 2011 in the case is pertinent, we extract hereunder the complete order dated 19th September, 2016 :

6. Mr. Gurbaksh Singh, Mr. Lakhmi Chand, Advocate for the victim Jagsher Singh.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S. TEJI ORDER % 19.09.2016

1. It is submitted by Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for Shri Sajjan Kumar (in Crl. A. No.1099/2013) that the appeal may be adjourned as he wishes to file an application seeking recusal from hearing of these matters by one of us (Justice P.S. Teji).

(Emphasis supplied)

22. These observations (in para 28 of the High Court judgment) were reproduced and approved by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported at (2009) 8 SCC 106 R.K. Anand v Registrar, Delhi High Court in para 262 and 263 which require to be extracted in extenso and read thus :

"262. Having thus dealt with the rest of the allegations made in the recusal application, the order, towards its end, said something which alone was sufficient to reject the request for recusal. It was pointed out that the applicant had a flourishing practice; he had been frequently appearing in the Court of Sarin, J. ever since he was appointed as a Judge and for the past twelve years was getting orders, both favourable and unfavourable, for his different clients. He never complained of any unfair treatment by Sarin, J. but recalled his old "hostility" with the Judge only after the notice was issued to him.
'It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party.' [Ed.: See also JRL, ex p CJL, In re, (1986) 161 CLR 342, 352 : (1986) 66 ALR
239.] "

xxx

76. These issues have been succinctly discussed by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa [President of the Republic of South Africav. South African Rugby Football Union, (1999) 4 SA 147 : 1999 ZACC 9] , on an application for recusal of four of the Judges in the Constitutional Court. After elaborately considering the factual matrix as well as the legal position, the Court held as follows: (ZACC para 104) "104. ... While litigants have the right to apply for the recusal of judicial officers where there is a reasonable apprehension that they will not decide a case impartially, this does not give them the right to object to their cases being heard by particular judicial officers simply because they believe that such persons will be less likely to decide the case in their favour, than would other judicial officers drawn from a different segment of society. The nature of the judicial function involves the performance of difficult and at times unpleasant tasks. Judicial officers are nonetheless required to 'administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law'. To this end they must resist all manner of pressure, regardless of where it comes from. This is the constitutional duty common to all judicial officers. If they deviate, the independence of the judiciary would be undermined, and in turn, the Constitution itself."