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Showing contexts for: REFUSAL OF PASSPORT in Mohan Lal @ Mohna vs Union Of India And Ors on 14 July, 2023Matching Fragments
(c):
35. But that does not mean that an order made under Section 10(3)(c) may not violate Article 19(1)(a) or (g). While discussing the Constitutional validity of the impugned order impounding the passport of the petitioner, we shall have occasion to point out that even where a statutory provision empowering an authority to take action is Constitutionally valid, action taken under it may offend a fundamental right and in that event, though the statutory 9 of 36 Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:088633 CWP-27167 of 2018 -10- 2023:PHHC:088633 and all connected cases provision is valid, the action may be void. Therefore, even though Section 10(3)(c) is valid, the question would always remain whether an order made under it is invalid as contravening a fundamental right. The direct and inevitable effect of an order impounding a passport may, in a given case, be to abridge or take away freedom of speech and expression or the right to carry on a profession and where such is the case, the order would be invalid, unless saved by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). Take for example, a pilot with international flying licence. International flying is his profession and if his passport is impounded, it would directly interfere with his right to carry on his profession and unless the order can be justified on the ground of public interest under Article 19(6), it would be void as offending Article 19(1)(g). Another example may be taken of an evangelist who has made it a mission of his life to preach his faith to people all over the world and for that purpose, sets up institutions in different countries. If an order is made impounding his passport, it would directly affect his freedom of speech and expression and the challenge to the validity of the order under Article 19(1)(a) would be unanswerable unless it is saved by Article 19(2). We have taken these two examples only by way of illustration. There may be many such cases where the restriction imposed is apparently only on the right to go abroad but the direct and inevitable consequence is to interfere with the freedom of speech and expression or the right to carry on a profession. A musician may want to go abroad to sing, a dancer to dance, a rising professor to teach and a scholar to participate in a conference or seminar. If in such a case his passport is denied or impounded, it would directly interfere with his freedom of speech and expression. If a correspondent of a newspaper is given a foreign assignment and he is refused passport or his passport is impounded, it would be direct interference with his freedom to carry on his profession.
"Section 6. Refusal of passport, travel documents etc. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the passport authority shall refuse to make an endorsement for visiting any foreign country under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub- section (2) of Section 5 on any one or more of the following grounds, and on no other ground, namely:-
(a) that the applicant may, or is likely to, engage in such country in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India;
"7. The right to travel abroad for which a passport is a sine qua non has been recognised in Maneka Gandhi's case as a fundamental right. Restraints on fundamental rights are to be strictly construed and so should Section 6(2)(f) of the Act of 1967 be. The words in the said section are that for refusal of a passport or renewal, a case against the applicant should be pending in a criminal court. Section 6(2)(f) of the Act of 1967 requires a wholistic construction, contextual with other clauses of Section 6(2) of the Act of 1967. To read into the clause (1) of Section 6(2) of the Act of 1967, a disability for an applicant to get a passport in the first instance or 'a renewal despite an acquittal would be quite absurd as Section 6(2)(e) of the Act of 1967 effectively allows for grant of passport in spite of a conviction even for an offence of moral turpitude where the sentence is less than two years. To avoid absurdity in the consequence flowing from a literal reading of Section 6(2)(f) of the Act of 1967 where on the one hand despite acquittal, pending appeal, the Passport Officer could refuse a passport for reason of the pending appeal and, on the other hand, in spite of conviction and sentence albeit of less than two years grant a passport under Section 6(2)(e) of the Act of 1967, the inevitable conclusion has to be that the words "proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an applicant pending before a criminal court in India" should be construed as referring only to matters before the trial court and not
(f) of the Act of 1967, not be a criminal court.
Consequently an appeal against acquittal pending in High Court in exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction would not entitle the Passport Officer to refuse an application for issue of passport or its renewal. This conclusion is based on the interpretation of the words "criminal court" limited to the manner they are referred to in Section 6(2)(f) of the Act of 1967, based on the definitions of the said words in statutes para materia, the need for a restrictive interpretation of laws impugning on fundamental rights of citizens, the need to harmonize an otherwise palpable interpretative absurdity arising from a literal and expansive reading of Section 6(2)(f) vis-a-vis Section 6(2)(e) where a convict suffering upto two years of sentence can not be refused a passport yet despite acquitted in a criminal case for reason of pendency of an appeal there against, the issue of passport can be refused.