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ISSUE II - Bar of Double Jeopardy and Impermissibility of Second FIR

9. Article 20(2) of the Constitution declares that "no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once". Section 300(1) CrPC gives statutory expression to this principle, embodying the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, and prohibiting a second trial for "the same offence" or on "the same facts" after a conviction or acquittal by a competent court. Section 300(2) extends this protection to bar a subsequent trial for any "other offence" that could have been charged in the earlier proceedings under Section 221 CrPC on the same facts. 9.1. The governing test is the identity of the ingredients and factual substratum, not mere thematic similarity. Where the offences are distinct in their essential ingredients, a second prosecution may lie even if narratives intersect8. Conversely, as held in Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao & Anr.9 and T.P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala10, a second prosecution founded on the same criminal act, or on a cognate offence that could and should have been charged in the first trial on the same facts, is barred by Section 300 CrPC.

Application of the Bar under Article 20(2), Section 300 CrPC, and the "Test of Sameness"

12. Section 300(1): "Same offence" on the "same facts" - Section 411 IPC punishes the dishonest receipt or retention of stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen. In both prosecutions, the State relied on the same act of possession and recovery proved through the Dwarka seizure. The Petitioner's 2014 conviction under Section 411/34 IPC in FIR No. 23/2013 therefore exhausted the right of the State to prosecute him again for the same offence. The subsequent conviction in FIR No. 306/2012 under Section 411/34 IPC is thus barred by Section 300(1) CrPC and Article 20(2). The test of sameness articulated in Babubhai and Anju Chaudhary applies: both proceedings emanate from the identical incident and recovery, rendering the second prosecution jurisdictionally void.

15. A plea of guilt cannot confer jurisdiction. Once the bar under Section 300 CrPC or the rule against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) applies, the conviction is a nullity, irrespective of the voluntariness of the plea or the sufficiency of evidence.

Conclusion on Issue II

16. The Petitioner's conviction dated 16th September, 2015, under Sections 411/34 and 482/34 IPC in CC No. 49189/2016, rests on the same Dwarka recovery of 11th February, 2013 that had already formed the basis of his conviction dated 26th November, 2014 in FIR No. 23/2013. The identity of incident, evidence, and offence is complete for Section 411/34 IPC, while Section 482/34 IPC constitutes an "other offence" that could have been charged in the earlier proceeding. Applying the test of sameness and the consequence test, the subsequent prosecution and conviction were without jurisdiction. The later conviction thus stands vitiated by Article 20(2) and Section 300 CrPC.

ISSUE III - Invalidity of the 2015 Conviction: Procedural Irregularity and Jurisdictional Bar

17. Where an accused raises an objection under Section 300 CrPC, the issue goes to the competence of the court and must be determined before recording any plea. A guilty plea cannot validate a proceeding that the law itself prohibits.

18. The order dated 10th September, 2015 records: (i) non-production of case property; (ii) discharge of PW Ct. Raghuveer unexamined; and (iii) an application under Section 300 CrPC filed by the accused and posted for consideration on 16th September, 2015. On that date, however, without adjudicating the pending objection, the Petitioner and co-accused were permitted to plead guilty to Sections 411, 482, and 34 IPC, and were sentenced to the period already undergone. The supplementary chargesheet filed in case FIR No. 306/2012 itself rested entirely on the same Dwarka seizure that had earlier resulted in the 2014 conviction.