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"Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design - when there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it."

This section mainly could be divided into two: the first part talks of where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, and it is only when this condition precedent is satisfied that the subsequent part of the section comes into operation and it is material to note that this part of the Section talks of reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons have conspired together and this evidently has reference to S.120-A where it is provided "When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done". This further has been safeguarded by providing a proviso that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy. It will be therefore necessary that a prima facie case of conspiracy has to be established for application of S.10. The second part of Section talks of anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to the common intention after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is relevant fact against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose for proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. It is clear that this second part permits the use of evidence which otherwise could not be used against the accused person. It is well settled that act or action of one of the accused could not be used as evidence against the other. But an exception has been carved out in S.10 in cases of conspiracy. The second part operates only when the first part of the section is clearly established i.e. there must be reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together in the light of the language of S.120A. It is only then the evidence of action or statements made by one of the accused, could be used as evidence against the other. In Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra (1964) 2 SCR 378, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) analysed the provision of S.10 and made the following observations:

"This section, as the opening words indicate will come into play when the court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, that is to say, there should be a prima facie evidence that a person was a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be used against his co-conspirators. Once such a reasonable ground exists, anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention, after the said intention was entertained, is relevant against the others, not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy but also for proving that the other person was a party to it. The evidentiary value of the said acts is limited by two circumstances, namely, that the acts shall have reference to their common intention and in respect of a period after such intention was entertained by any one of them. The expression in reference to their common intention is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words "in furtherance of in the English law; with the result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Another important limitation implicit in the language is indicated by the expressed scope of its relevancy. Anything so said, done or written is a relevant fact only 'as against each of the person believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it'. It can be used only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy or that the other person was a party to it. It cannot be said in favour of the other party or for the purpose of showing that such a person was not a party to the conspiracy. In short, the Section can be analysed as follows: (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; (5) it can only be used against a co- conspirator and not in his favour."