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Mr. Gupta, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State, on the contrary, has contended that when the petitioner has been convicted under the NDPS Act, he is not entitled to the benefit of parole and further the order passed by the District Magistrate, Narsinghpur, is based on the report submitted by the Superintendent of Police and hence, no fault can be found with the said order.

5. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is apposite to refer to certain provisions of the Act. Sections 31-A to 31-E of the Act have been inserted by way of amendment in the State of M.P. They read as under :

(c) travelling allowances for prisoners during the period of leave;
(d) restrictions on the movement of prisoners during the period of leave; and
(e) cancellation of leave any emergency leave or forfeiture of bond in case of violation of conditions of leave."

On a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it is quite apparent that the petitioner is eligible to be considered for grant of temporary release. Mr. Gupta, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State urged with vehemence that the petitioner having been convicted under Section 20(b)(i) of the NDPS Act is not entitled to temporary release. In this context it is apposite to refer to the decision rendered in the case of Dadu alias Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 437 wherein a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court while dwelling on the constitutional validity of Section 32A of the NDPS Act, dealt with the concept of parole and held as under:

"6. Parole is not a suspension of sentence. The conviction continues to be serving the sentence despite granting of parole under the statute, rules, jail manual or the Government Orders. "Parole" means the release of a prisoner temporarily for a special purpose before the expiry of a sentence, on the promise of good behaviour and return to jail. It is a release from jail, prison or other internment after actually being in jail serving part of sentence."

Their Lordships referred to the decisions rendered in the cases of Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347, State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 394, Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 409 and State of Haryana v. Nauratta Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 514 and ultimately expressed the view that the parole does not amount to the suspension, remission or commutation of sentences which could be withheld under the garb of Section 32A of the NDPS Act and notwithstanding the provisions of the offending section, a convict is entitled to parole, subject however, to the conditions governing the grant of it under the statute, if any, or the jail manual or the government instructions.