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(2 of 17) [CMA-2780/2016]

2. The facts, leading to the present misc. appeal, in nutshell, are that a contract was executed between respondent-contractor and the appellant Union of India in respect of extension of runway and the date of completion of work was upto 24.11.2006 but the work was completed at very slow speed on 26.08.2008 and final bill was paid on 26.09.2009 and the same is accepted with demure by the contractor. Later on, the contractor claimed payment as per rates prevailing at the time of completion of work and raised other disputes as such the matter was referred to the arbitrator. The sole Arbitrator after hearing both the sides, passed award dated 27.02.2012 against the appellant Union of India by partly allowing claim of the respondent-contractor. The Arbitrator while partly allowing the Claims No.1, 2, 3, 8, 13, 14 & 16 of the respondent-contractor awarded pendente-lite simple interest @10% per annum to be reckoned from 26 th May, 2009. Further, the Arbitrator allowed appellant Union of India three months' time to pay the award amount on or before 30 th May, 2012 else the amount shall carry simple interest @12% per annum from 1st June 2012 and there shall be no future interest on the awarded amount and pendent-lite interest as per clause (a) of Para 166 of the award.

3. Feeling dismayed with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, appellant Union of India submitted application under Section 34 of the Act before learned Court below. In its application, assailing (3 of 17) [CMA-2780/2016] the arbitral award on various grounds, Union of India craved for setting aside the same on the anvil of grounds available under Section 34 of the Act. The application is contested by the respondent-contractor by submitting a brief reply. The application submitted on behalf of appellant Union of India did not find favour of the learned Court below and thus entailed its rejection by the impugned order.

(4 of 17) [CMA-2780/2016]

5. Mr. Sanjeet Purohit, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the appellant, has vehemently argued that the phrase "Public Policy of India" has a wide connotation but the learned Court below has failed to consider it in right perspective. Learned counsel would urge that Hon'ble Court has given expansive meaning to the fundamental policy of Indian law or the interest of India or justice or morality by broadening horizons but by construing the same narrowly, rendered the impugned order vulnerable. It is contended by Mr. Purohit that the core question as to whether, as per contract, addition of polymer comes in the category of radical changes or normal change, not at all decided/adjudicated by the Arbitrator and is completely eschewed by the learned Court below. Elaborating his submission in this behalf, learned counsel submits that fundamental basis of adjudication, as the specification adopted were based on consideration of structural safety of the runway and in no case be treated as radical change, is not at all given due credence by the learned Court below.

6. It is also urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the claims were not at all co-related yet were clubbled and without any rationale award was passed without arriving at a clear conclusion about the rate of allowing price but that too was ignored by the learned Court below. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Court below has not recorded any finding worth the name while repudiating the application of the appellant (5 of 17) [CMA-2780/2016] and on the face of it impugned order is a non-speaking order, which by no stretch of imagination be categorized as proper adjudication. In support of his arguments, Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on following judgments: