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14. The consequential order passed by the trial court that as the main petition itself has been decided, the application under Section 24 of the Act was dismissed, was set aside by the High Court and interim alimony and expenses of the proceedings in the trial court were awarded.

15. It appears from a bare perusal of the provisions of Section 24 of the Act that the provision has been made in order to provide means to the spouse who has no independent source of income to contest a matrimonial proceeding. The indigent spouse should be allowed to obtain the requisite maintenance and litigation expenses from the other party, soon after the filing of the application under Section 24 of the Act, in order that the indigent spouse could maintain herself during the pendency of the proceedings, and also incur the legitimate expenses for contesting the matrimonial dispute. If the proceedings under Section 24 of the Act are allowed to linger on and are unreasonably delayed on account of the dilatory tactics adopted by 'he other party or on account of lack of vigilance o" prompt action on the part of the trial court, then the very purpose of inserting the provisions of Section 24 in the Act would be defeated. The indigent spouse might have provided herself with the requisite means to fight out the matrimonial cause in some other way, but she is entitled to reimburse herself or to repay the debt taken from others, if she has raised the money from others. Undoubtedly, the expression "where in any proceeding", with which Section 24 begins leads to the conclusion that the order granting interim maintenance and litigation expenses should be passed during the pendency of the proceedings in the main petition. As a matter of fact, it is expected that when an application under Section 24 of the Act is filed during the pendency of a matrimonial cause, the court should proceed to decide the application as expeditiously as possible and should not postpone the decision on that application up to the last stage of deciding the main petition. The application under Section 24 is no doubt an interlocutory application, which may not survive after the date the matrimonial cause conies to an end. But such petition moved for interim maintenance and litigation expenses should be decided during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act soon after it is filed and the right of the indigent spouse to obtain interim alimony and ligitation expenses from the other party could not be defeated by allowing lime to lapse or by postponing the decision of the application under Section 24 of the Act to the fag-end of the trial of the main case. Of course, it would be different if the application under Section 24 of the Act is not pressed by the wife until the final conclusion of the matrimonial case, as was done in Rita Mago's case (1981-1 DMC 1), leading to the inference that the said application must be deemed to have been abandoned, on account of the conduct of the wife. In Smt. Chitra Lekha's case (AIR 1977 Delhi 176) the learned Judge of the Delhi High Court himself Observed that the application for interim alimony should not be allowed to lapse, but if the application is allowed to lapse and passing of orders on such an application under Section 24 is deferred until the fag-end of the proceedings in the matrimonial case, then the aggrieved wife cannot be left with a remedy. With utmost respect to the learned Judge, I may observe that if the view taken in Chitra Lekha's case is accepted, then as soon as the main petition is withdrawn, or is allowed to be dismissed in default, the application for interim alimony would automatically come to an end which would lead to the conclusion that if the proceedings are deferred for a long time and the main petition thereafter abruptly comes to an end, then the indigent wife would be deprived of her right under Section 24 of the Act to obtain interim alimony and expenses of litigation for no fault of hers. The necessity of deciding an. application for interim maintenance and litigation expenses filed under Section 24 of the Act as early as possible after the same is filed, and ordinarily before the trial, of the main petition begins, at least during the pendency of the main petition, must be emphasised. The decision of the application under Section 24 of the Act for interim alimony and litigation expenses can in no event be postponed until the final disposal of the main petition and in all circumstances it must be disposed of before the termination of the proceedings in the main petition. Even in Chitra Lekha's case referred to above, it was held that the application under Section 24 should be decided judicially as expeditiously as possible and parties should not be encouraged to continue with the proceedings for interim maintenance and litigation expenses by deferring orders on such application. Thus, it needs to be emphasised that the court dealing with a matrimonial case for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights or any other proceedings under the Act, where the respondent spouse has a right to claim interim maintenance and litigation expenses under Section 24, on the ground that he or she has no independent income sufficient for support and the necessary expenses for the proceedings and an application under Section 24 of the Act is moved during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act, then it is the bounden duly of the court to decide the application for interim maintenance and litigation expenses as expeditiously as possible before the trial of the main petition begins and at any rate definitely before the decision of the main petition. The proceedings in respect of an application under Section 24 of the Act should not be frequently adjourned and deferred for some reason or the other or without any reason until the trial of the main petition comes to an end, as the principal object for which interim alimony has to be granted would itself be frustrated if the respondent spouse is not put into possession of the necessary funds for maintaining herself and to meet the expenses of the litigation soon after the application under Section 24 is moved. That is why Section 24 speaks of "it appears t0 the court" instead of providing that "it is proved before the court" and as such Section 24 application can be and should ordinarily be disposed of on the basis of affidavits produced by and on behalf of the parties. One of the reasons given in Nirmala Devi's case (AIR 1973 Punj and Har 48) as to why the order on the application under Section 24 of the Act cannot be passed after the decision of the main petition was that in case the order for payment of amount relating to interim maintenance and litigation expenses is not complied with then the aggrieved party would not be able to enforce such an order, I may with great respect observe that Section 28A of the Act provides the procedure for enforcement of decrees and orders passed by the court in any proceedings under the Act and by virtue of Section 28A an order passed under Section 24 of the Act can be enforced as a money decree. Of course, if the order under Section 24 is passed during the pendency of the main petition and the same is disobeyed, in 'addition to the enforcement of the order as a money decree by virtue of the provisions of Section 28A, the court could stay the proceedings in the main petition, strike out the defence of the defaulting party or dismiss the main petition, as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of the case. There can be no doubt that it is imperative that an application under Section 24 of the Ad should be decided in any event before the disposal of the proceedings in the main petition under the Act.

"The same conclusion in our opinion could perhaps be come to on the well-settled principle in our jurisprudence that it is one of the first and the highest duties of a court to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors before it. See Rodger v. Comptoir d' Escopte de Paris ( (1871) 173 PC 469)."

20. Thus, it is well settled that the court by its action or inaction, deliberate or mistaken, cannot take away the right of a party or take away a remedy which was otherwise available to the litigant, as that would amount to causing an injury to the litigant by an act of the court. If the court goes on deferring the disposal of the application under Section 24 of the Act for interim alimony and litigation expenses, knowingly or unwittingly, until the main proceedings under the Act come to an end and thereafter dismisses the application under Section 24 on the ground that it has become infructuous as the main petition has been disposed of, it would certainly cause injury to one of the suitors for no fault of his and such an illegal action on the part of the court must be heid to be without jurisdiction. The court has jurisdiction to decide the matters before it according to law, but not in violation of law or to defeat the rights of a party by its action or inaction. In such circumstances this Court is bound to interfere in the revisional jurisdiction with the order dismissing the application for interim maintenance and litigation expenses and determine the amount of interim alimony and litigation expenses while hearing the revision petition.

21. In the present case, as I have already mentioned above, the application under Section 24 of the Act was moved by the wife on Aprl 25, 1980 during the pendency of the petition for divorce. The application was duly pressed by the wife and an order for interim maintenance was passed by the trial court on May 25, 1981, although no order was passed for litigation expenses and the decision of that question was deferred. Then the husband approached this Court in revision, which was allowed on July 27, 1981 and the matter was remanded and the parties were required to appear before the trial court on August 10, 1981 for further proceedings, in accordance with the directions of this Court in respect of the application under Section 24. But on August 10, 1981 the husband submitted an application for withdrawal of the main petition instead of taking proceedings, as directed by this Court, for determination of the amount of interim alimony. It was incumbent upon the trial court at that stage to decide the application for interim alimony and litigation expenses, in accordance with the directions of this Court contained in the order dated July 27, 1981, before closing the proceedings in the main petition. It appears that the trial court heard both the matters together, namely, the question of withdrawal of the main petition as also the question of grant of interim maintenance and litigation expenses and the survival of the petition for interim maintenance after the application for withdrawal of the main petition was filed. The trial court should have decided the application under Section 24 first before proceeding to pass the final order allowing the withdrawal of the main petition. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the husband is that although both the orders fixing interim maintenance as also allowing withdrawal of the main petition were passed on the same day, yet a reading of the two orders shows 'hat the order allowing the withdrawal of the divorce petition was passed earlier in point of time as the same finds a reference in the order fixing the amount of interim maintenance. Learned counsel appears to be right in his submission, but the trial court was definitely wrong in disposing of the main petition earlier to the application under Section 24 and in this revision petition I am not prepared to hold that the court is powerless to decide the question of interim maintenance notwithstanding the fact the main petition was disposed of earlier by the trial court on the same day. The wife in the present case had vigilantly prosecuted her application under Section 24 and merely because of the indiscretion of the trial court, she could not be deprived of her right to "obtain interim maintenance, and litigation expenses.

24. As. regards litigation expenses, the trial court had deferred the consideration of the question to a future date, while passing the order dated May 25, 1981, but since then it never determined the amount of litigation expenses payable by the husband to the wife in respect of the proceedings in the trial court. I am of the view that the wife is entitled to get a sum of Rs. 400/- towards litigation expenses of the trial court. The amount of arrears of interim maintenance as also the litigation expenses may be paid by the husband to the wife, after deducting the sum of Rs. 1,000/- which has already been paid, within a period of 4 months,