Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

*

1. The question involved in the above-captioned eight petitions is of territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner had filed eight complaints under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before a Metropolitan Magistrate, Dwarka Courts, Delhi, against the Respondents regarding bouncing of cheques.

2. Vide impugned orders of 12th January, 2009 and 25th February, 2009, trial court has dismissed Petitioner's aforesaid complaints on the ground of territorial jurisdiction by relying upon a recent verdict of the Apex Court in the case of "Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. and Anr. Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd.", reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720.

4. Petitioner's counsel has been heard at length and the decision in (1999) 7 SCC 510, relied upon by him have been perused.

5. I shall first deal with the first six petitions, which have not been entertained by the trial court at its threshold by holding vide impugned order that it does not have territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter of Petitioner's complaints under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

6. In these petitions, it is not in dispute that the Respondents are residing outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court and the bank of the Respondent is also beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. In the impugned order, trial court has quoted paragraphs No. 24 and 25 from a recent verdict of the Apex Court in the case Crl. Rev. P. No. 199-206/2009 and 210-217/2009 Page 3 of "Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. and Anr. Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd.", reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720, which reads as under:-

12. In M/s. Harman Electronics (Supra), a contention was raised that a debtor must seek the creditor should be applied in a case of this nature and it was repelled in the following words:-

"We regret that such a principle cannot be applied in a criminal case. Jurisdiction of the Court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle."

13. It needs no elaboration that when two decisions of coordinate benches of the Apex Court are cited, then the Crl. Rev. P. No. 199-206/2009 and 210-217/2009 Page 8 later one prevails. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Shamshad Begum (supra) relied upon by the Petitioner is of 3rd November, 2008; whereas, the Apex Court decision in the case of M/s. Harman Electronics (Supra) is of 12th December, 2008. I find myself unable to agree with the reasoning in decision rendered by a Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Manjul vs. Wasim Shekh (Supra), as the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Harman Electronics (Supra) cannot be brushed aside by simply observing that it was rendered in a different context and by relying upon the decision in the case of K. Bhaskaran (Supra).

15. The aforesaid ground reality stands illustrated from Crl. Rev. P. No. 210/2009, wherein the Respondent- Crl. Rev. P. No. 199-206/2009 and 210-217/2009 Page 9 accused is from Vellore, which is in South India and the complaint regarding dishonor of cheque has been filed in Delhi courts. Taking note of such a situation, Apex Court in the case of M/s. Harman Electronics (Supra) has declared in unequivocal terms that financial institutions, ought not to be permitted to do forum hunting as per their convenience, much to the grave harassment of the accused and a balance has to be struck. I am in respectful agreement with the above said ratio of the decision in the case of M/s. Harman Electronics (Supra).