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Showing contexts for: IPC 219 in Rajeev Sharma vs State Of U.P. And Others on 14 May, 2019Matching Fragments
1. This Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by Rajeev Sharma, one time Branch Manager, Bank of Baroda, Station Road Branch, Najibabad, District Bijnor. At the time of filing this Application, the Applicant was posted as Branch Manager, Ossian Plaza Branch, Bank of Baroda, Sector 18, NOIDA, District Gautam Budh Nagar. By this Application, he has sought to quash the criminal complaint giving rise to Complaint Case no.1586 of 2003, Sri Krishna Gupta vs. Rajeev Sharma, and the summoning order dated 26.07.2003 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Najibabad, District Bijnor in the aforesaid case, under Sections 218 and 219 IPC. The complaint and all proceedings arising from it, that are hereinafter referred to as the impugned proceedings, were brought by opposite party no.2, Sri Krishna Gupta. Sri Krishna Gupta is now no more.
9. Heard Sri J.P.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav, learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State and perused the record.
10. Learned counsel for the Applicant has submitted that the discharge order dated 04.07.2002, or whatever kind of order it was exonerating four of the five accused, who were initially summoned in Complaint Case no.466 of 2002, was based on the premise that there was no evidence to show that the alleged offence was committed, in collusion with the other accused. The Magistrate in that case relied on the resolution of the Company, and not on the information given by the Applicant. It was further urged that the Applicant furnished information in all bona fides without any culpable intent on his part. He submits that if there was any doubt, the complainant could have got the record of documents filed in Complaint Case no.466 of 2002 summoned, which would have clarified the issue. There is absolutely no basis to file the complaint, which is patently mala fide. It is also urged that assuming that all allegations are true, no offence under Section 219 IPC is made as the Applicant never gave any report, order, verdict, or decision at any stage of a judicial proceeding, knowing it to be contrary to law. He submits that the ingredients of Section 219 IPC are not at all made out ex facie. It is urged most strenuously by the learned counsel for the Applicant that the impugned proceedings have been brought for the sake of harassing the Applicant, out of some misdirected malice and ill-will, harboured by the complainant.
12. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions. So far as the offence under Section 219 IPC is concerned, the same is not made out on a bare reading of the complaint, giving rise to the impugned proceedings. Section 219 IPC reads as under:
"219. Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report, etc., contrary to law.--Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any stage of a judicial proceeding, any report, order, verdict, or decision which he knows to be contrary to law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
13. Apparently, the information that was furnished by the Applicant on 24.06.2002 was under the Right to Information Act, or may be under some other public information mechanism, which does not at all show that it was ever given by him being a public servant by way of a report, order, verdict, or decision at any stage of a judicial proceeding. The information was furnished without the purpose of the same being to serve as a report in the course of judicial proceedings. Of course, there is no question of a Bank Manager pronouncing an order, verdict, or decision in the course of a judicial proceeding. The closest that the matter could come to the ingredients of Section 219 IPC would be a report, but the information supplied by the Applicant, does not show it to be a report made at any stage of a judicial proceeding. It is just an information supplied, under whatever statutory obligation to a member of the public, may be an Advocate. The memorandum of information does not indicate to its face that the person seeking the information intended to use it during the course of a judicial proceeding, which clearly leads to the inference that the ingredients of Section 219 IPC are not at all made out, even if all allegations in the complaint giving rise to the impugned proceedings are to be accepted as they stand.