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15. We propose to pick up first the 13 Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court which considered in the case of Keshava-nanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 146 the constitutionality of the 24th, 25th and 29th amendments to the Constitution, which is a milestone judgment of the Apex Court of the country and marks a water shade in the constitutional jurisprudence. By a majority of 7 against 6, the Court ruled that Article 368 of the Constitution does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. There was a 7 to 5 opinion, however, in favour of the view that there was no implied limitation on the powers of the Parliament to amend Article 368 of the Constitution and one learned Judge expressed the view that it was not necessary to consider the existence or otherwise of implied or inherent limitations. The majority opined however that the basic structure of the Constitution could not be altered by any constitution amendment. They held in unambiguous terms that one of the basic features is the existence of the constitutional system of judicial review. Mathew J., the learned Judge who fell on the side of the minority view and Baig. J., the learned Judge who was with him also agreed with the view that as an ordinary law derives its validity from its conformity with the Constitution, so also an amendment of the Constitution derives its validity from the Constitution and an amendment to the Constitution can be ultra vires as an ordinary law can be. They held that the validity of an amendment to the Constitution is limited to seeing that the form and the manner of the amendment is properly observed. One of us (M. N. Rao J.) who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench in S. Harinath v. State of A. p.. (1993 (2) Andh WR 484) (supra) has said :

We refer next to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, . A Constitution Bench of five Judges went into the question of the validity of the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975. The question directly posed in the said judgment was whether judicial power must intervene in the interest of purity of elections and the Court adverted to almost all aspects of the matter and said that there was every justification to say that democracy is an essential feature of the Constitution; and pointed out that the basis of our Constitution is a well-planned legal order the presuppositions of which are accepted by the people as determining the methods by which the functions of the Government will be discharged and the power of the State shall be used. The consensus of the opinion is that judicial review is a basic feature except in respect of matters which are specifically excluded by the Constitution as originally enacted and that "Courts act as the real interpreters of the real will of the people .... they perform an essential judicial function." The third in line is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, . Speaking as to the validity of Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, the majority opined that insertion of clauses (4) and (5) in Article 368 of the Constitution was void and unconstitutional since it was viola-tive of the basic structure of the Constitution and beyond the amending power of the Parliament. Bhagawati, J., who delivered the dissenting judgment and upheld the constitutionality of the above opined that the Court could examine whether there was connection between the impugned law and the directive principle and if the answer was that the connection was substantial, the law must be sustained. It is aptly stated and so we propose to take out the relevant passage from the judgment in S. Hari Nath (1993 (2) Andh WR 484) (FB) (supra)-

The learned Judge added a limitation:

"Of course, when I say this, I should not be taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament".

The learned Judge again, observed in the next sentence:

"But what I wish to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic, structure of the Constitution."

This has however given rise to another line of judgments one in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 in P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. : (AIR 1987 SC 663). These judgments proceed on the footing that the basic features of the Constitution stand protected for Art. 32, the power of the Supreme Court, cannot be taken away and its power under Art. 136 can be a proper safeguard of judicial review of any adjudication by the alternative authority or forum, provided however it is an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement of judicial review. This view in Sampath Kumar found a fuller expression in P. Sambamurthy (supra). This judgment also emphasises that it is through the power of judicial review conferred on an independent institutional authority such as the High Court that the rule of law is maintained, and every organ of the State is kept within the limits of the law and that "Now if the exercise of the power of judicial review can be set at naught by the State Government by overriding the decision given against it, it would sound the death knell of the of rule law. The rule of law would cease to have any meaning, because then it would be open to the State Government to defy the law and yet to get away with it." We can conclude, without confining to the limits of the pronouncement in S. Harinath (1993 (2) Andh WR 484) (FB) (supra), that a Constitution amendment which tends to take away the Constitutional courts power, that is the power of the High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution shall be invalid. There can be no matter in the hands of the Legislature in its function as the law maker which will be kept out of the scrutiny of the Courts however limited that scrutiny be. Even the conserva-tive view that if there is an alternative effective. and efficient mechanism for judicial review which is as independent as the High Court, its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution will not be available, leaves scope for the Court to see whether the mechanism is such that the Court should refrain and not exercise its jurisdiction. We are inclined to extent this principle and hold as above as respects the matters which are sought to be excluded from the judicial review under Art. 243-O of the Constitution which has been brought in by the 73rd Amendment. We are conscious of the fact that this provision has similarities with what is provided under Art. 329 of the Constitution of India. After the words "but subject to the provisions of Art. 329-A" which had been introduced in Art. 329 i.e., the words figures and letters "but subject to the provisions of Art. 329A" have been omitted since some part of the amendment was held ultra vires in Indira Gandhi (supra). Art. 329 reads as follows:

Majority view in Kihota's case as to the scope of the judicial review and in answer to the question whether the Constitution (52nd amendment) Act, 1985 insofar as it sought to introduce the 10th Schedule was destructive of the basic structure of the . Constitution as it was violative of the fundamental principles of Parliamentary democracy, a basic feature of the Indian constitutionalism and the question whether under the Indian constitutional scheme, there is any immunity from constitutional correctives against a legislatively perceived political evil of unprincipled defections induced by the lure of office and monetary inducements is stated after an indepeth study in these words (at p45l'of AIR):