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16. At the hearing of this reference, Mr. Kotwal, learned counsel for the applicant. Submitted that the reservation of a power of revocation in favour of Narandas made all the trust deeds executed by Narandas void. The reason for this, according to Mr. Kotwal, was that a trust in which there was a power of revocation reserved to the settlor was a gift with a condition attached and, therefore, the trust was void under s. 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The second ground urged by Mr. Kotwal for contending that all the trust deeds were void was because, according to him, the first of the three certainties necessary for the creation of a valid trust were absent in the present case. Mr. Kotwal, however, did not argue that the trusts were void by reason of the provisions of s. 32 of the Transfer of Property Act. In our opinion, Mr. Kotwal rightly did not argue this point because s. 32 can possibly have no application to the present case, it merely deals with the imposition of an invalid condition subsequent and is merely a counterpart of s. 30 of the Transfer of Property Act and the effect of both these sections is that a condition which is void as condition precedent would also be void if it were imposed as a condition subsequent.

"(1) The words must be so used that on the whole they ought to be construed as imperative;

(2) The subject-matter of the trust must be certain; and (3) The objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the trust must be certain."

(See Snell's Principles of Equity. - Twenty-seventh edition, page 111.

34. While considering Mr. Kotwal's argument on this point, one must bear in mind what the Division Bench in Hanmantram's case , referred to above, held that the three certainties set out in the Indian Trusts Act which. As mentioned earlier, apply to private trusts are to be applicable to public trusts and it is equally pertinent to bear in mind that that very statute by s. 78 permits a settlor to reserve expressly to himself or to another a power to revoke the trust. A power of revocation reserved by a deed of trust has nothing to do with any of the three certainties. As long as the trust is not revoked, the trust would continue and would be binding upon the settlor, the argument on behalf of the trustee, Sir Robert peel, in the case of Sir Robert Peel's School [1867-68] 3 Ch App 543, referred to above, was that since Sir Robert Peel had reserved to himself under the deed of trust a power to revoke the said trust he was not bound to render accounts to the Charity Commissioner of his management of the trust properties. He had, however, not exercised that power of revocation and the court held that as the trust was not revoked he was bound to render accounts. This was the only authority cited in support of the argument that the trust were void and, for the reasons set out above, there is no substance whatever in this contention.

45. It was next argued on behalf of the respondents that the power of revocation reserved to Narandas under the first second, third and fourth deeds of trust was void as infringing the rule against perpetuity inasmuch as the revocation was to be either by Narandas or his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, it was submitted that if Narandas died intestate, as he in fact did, no one may take out letters of administration to his estate for a number of years, and if ultimately somebody did take out letters of administration, the person to do so may do it beyond the period of perpetuity and that such a possibility rendered the power of revocation void. In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon In re Watson's Settlement Trusts : Dawson v. Reid [1958] 1 WLR 732, in which the power of revocation was conferred upon the trustees of the deed of trust. The court held that as the power of revocation granted to trustees was not limited to the period of perpetuity, the power was void ab initio. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that the power of revocation did not create any interest in the trust property in favour of the person entitled to revoke the trust, but was a mere personal grant and that, therefore, the rule against perpetuity did not apply to a power of revocation in a deed of trust. We consider it unnecessary to discuss this question inasmuch as we have held that the power of revocation in each of the trust deeds in question had become or was inoperative and ineffectual.

47. It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents and the Charity Commissioner that a power of revocation contained in a deed of trust creating a public charitable trust was void as being against public policy. It was argued that though in some cases the trust property may only consist of the property settled by the settlor upon trust, in other cases, it may become augmented by donations given by the public and in the case of an immovable property it would, in such cases, be maintained, repaired and extended out of the amounts donated by the public; and to permit a settlor thereof to revoke the trust and not, only get back to himself his own property buy also the benefit which that property has enjoyed by reason of public donations or the accumulations which have come into being by reason of the public donations would be contrary to public policy. For the very same reason as mentioned above, we feel it equally unnecessary to give any finding on this aspect of the case.