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3.2.2. The Second Officer who was on navigational watch at the time of the accident, did not comprehend the limitation in maneuverability of the target fishing vessel, speed of which was around 6.3 knots visa-a-vis an overtaking merchant ship cruising at a speed of 19.4 knots. The ship should have steered well clear of the fishing vessel that was being overtaken as per the requirements of COLREGS.

3.2.3. The 354m long container ship failed to take avoidance action in ample time. Though, the container shi9p made minor alteration of course to maintain a CPA of 0.4 NM, as stated by the second officer, the alteration was not large enough to be readily apparent to the fishing boat. Also, the intention of second officer to maintain a very little CPA and 0.4 NM could not be achieved due to inconsistent actions i.e., initially container ship altered course to port side, then starboard side, then back to port side and then few degrees more to starboard side. Initially the ship was maintaining course of 335*when the target 412 (fishing boat) was at a distance of around 6.3 N miles at 00.32 hrs. The fishing vessel was bearing 336*throughout.

The ship continued her hearing 335*, till the fishing vessel came to a distance of about 3.2 NM at 00.42 hrs. At this point, the ship was found to alter her course to 344* which gave a CPA of 0.5 N miles, but the ship altered back to port side within few minute3s and came on a heading of 340* which reduced the CPA drastically. There is a possibility that this inconsistent action by the container ship might have confused the fishing vessel being overtaken. An appreciable alteration of course should have enabled the ship to steer past the fishing vessels in the vicinity without much risk of collision.

3.2.4. Although the duty officer has an assistant - look out person (rank AB) during the navigational watch, there was no effective communication between the two, regarding the developing situation and is a failure of Bridge team management.

3.2.5. On the Radar, the duty officer was seen switching intermittently between the two targets i.e., target 412 (fishing vessel Rabah) and another draft target 452 which was seen to be stationary while he could have selected and displayed both the targets simultaneously on the ARPA for easy reference. There were multiple alarms such as Bow crossing limit and the CPA/TCPA limit alarms intermittently which were alerting the duty officer to take collision avoidance action, but the bridge team were oblivious to the developing situation.

3.2.7. The examination of the Master and the on-duty personnel has revealed that they failed to understand the company SMS procedure manual regarding CPA & TCPA requirements for the 'open sea & coastal waters' and had a misconception about meaning of 'Restricted waters' as mentioned therein. The duty officer has reported that he was trying to maintain CPA of 0.4 NM which is applicable for restricted waters. But in the instant situation the ship was in open sea with ample see room in which minimum CPA of 1.0 NM was required to be maintained as per Masters standing orders. As per Company policy minimum CPA of 2.0 NM to be maintained in Open Sea and Coastal waters. The relevant extract of the SMS and Master's Standing Order are attached as Annexure-E. 3.2.8. The duty officer was found using Course over Ground (CoG) and Speed over Ground (SoG) input in ARPA for collision avoidance. At the time of incident, the ship was experiencing a current of 1.3 knots in NW'ly direction. The correct use of Heading and Speed over Water in ARPA could have given clear indication about the Course and speed over water of the fishing boat.