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Showing contexts for: Angadia in State Of Gujarat vs Angadia Kantilal Somabhai And Ors. on 25 June, 1982Matching Fragments
5. In order to answer the principal point arising in these three appeals, it would be advantageous if we bear in mind the relevant facts of these three appeals. In Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 1979 the respondent-accused is one Angadia Kantilal Somabhai. The Octroi Inspector of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation filed a complaint against him alleging that even though he was called upon by a requisition notice as per Sch. 'I, of R. 11 of the Rules to furnish particulars in respect of imports made during the period from 1si Feb., 1975 to 31st Dec., 1975 he failed to do so within the prescribed period after the receipt of the requisition and had, therefore, committed an offence punishable under Section 399 of the Act read with R. 11 of the Rules. In Appeal No. 326 of 1979 the respondent-accused is one Naranbhai Shankerbhai. He too was called upon by a similar notice to furnish information regarding the imports between 1st Jan., 1976 and 30th June, 1976 but he failed to do so within the prescribed period after the receipt of the requisition and had, therefore, committed a similar offence. In the last Criminal Appeal No. 327 of 1979 the accused Angadia N. Rajaram. Nagardas was called upon by a similar requisition notice to furnish particulars in respect of goods imported between 1st Jan., 1975 and 31st Dec., 1975 which be failed to do within the prescribed period after the receipt of the requisition and, therefore, committed a similar offence. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate convicted all the three accused and directed them to pay a fine of Rs. 25/- in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. Against the order of conviction the three accused persons preferred separate appeals which were disposed of by the learned City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad by his judgment and order dated Nov. 28, 1978. The learned City Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that even though by the definition of Standing Order 2.9 Angadias were "importers", they could not be said to be importers of goods within the meaning of the Rules and, therefore, they could not be called upon by a requisition notice as per Sch. 'I' of R. 11 to furnish the relevant information regarding the import of goods during the period mentioned in the respective requisition notices. He pointed out that even though the expression "importer" was defined by Standing Order 2.9, there was no such definition to be found in R. 2 of the Rules and, therefore, it was not possible to import the Standing Order definition for the purpose of determining the scope and ambit of R. 11 of the Rules. While deciding the question whether a person or a firm carrying on business of Angadia can be said to be an "importer' within the meaning of R. 11, the learned City Sessions Judge also referred to the language of Sch. 'I' wherefrom he concluded that the requisition notice under Sch. 'I' can only be served upon the owner and not the person who imports the goods within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad. He was also of the opinion that if Angadias are required to furnish such information as is required by Sch. 'I' of R. 11 of the Rules, it would cause considerable hardship to them because such information would be within the special knowledge of the owners and not the Angadias who are merely carriers of goods. In this view that he took, he came to the conclusion that the respondents-accused who were indisputably carrying on business as Angadias in the City of Ahmedabad at all material times could not be said to be "importers of goods" within the meaning of R. 11 of the Rules and, therefore, it was not open to the Commissioner or the authorised officer to serve them with requisition notices as per Sch. '1' calling upon them to furnish the particulars set out in the Various columns of that notice within 15 days from the receipt thereof. He, therefore, acquitted the respondents accused of the charge levelled against them.
8. It becomes clear from the definition of the term "import" found in R. 2 (a) and Standing Order 2.7 that if a person conveys or brings goods into Ahmadabad Municipal limits from any other area, it would amount to "importing goods" into Ahmedabad Municipal limits: Any person who conveys goods into Ahmedabad Municipal limits from any other area would, therefore, be an "importer of goods". According to the dictionary meaning indicated earlier, one who imports goods is an "importer of goods". Nowhere in the Rules has it been mentioned that only the owner of the goods will fall within the expression "importer of goods". The expression "importer" is defined in Standing Order 2.9 reproduced earlier. This definition must be consistent with the Act and the Rules in view of the language of Section 466 of the Act. Once it is held from the definition of the term "import" that an importer of goods is that person who conveys goods into Ahmedabad Municipal limits from any other area outside the said limits, there is no reason to limit the scope of the said expression by holding that an importer of goods is only that person who owns the goods. Such words of limitation are not found in the Act, the Rules or the Standing Orders. In fact, the Standing Order definition of "importer" makes it clear beyond my manner of doubt that even an Angadia who imports goods into Ahmedabad Municipal limits would be liable to pay octroi at the Octroi Naka unless delivery of the goods is obtained by the owner at the said Octroi Naka. The learned Sessions Judge in his judgment observes that ordinarily an Angadia would not fall within the term "importer" and, therefore, he is specifically sought to be Included within the meaning of that expression by standing order 2.9. Now there is no justification, having regard to the definition of the term "import" in the Rules as well as the Standing Order, to take the view that ordinarily an Angadia cannot be said to be an importer of goods. If an Angadia brings goods within the Ahmedabad Municipal limits from any other limit, he would be an "importer of goods" within the meaning of the Rules as well as the Standing Order 2.9. The definition in the Standing Order is, therefore, quite consistent with the Rules framed under S. 457 read with S. 149 of the Act.
9. It was argued before the learned Sessions Judge that Angadias can be regarded as " importers" up to the stage of entry of goods within Ahmedabad Municipal limits and no further and, therefore, they cannot be called upon to answer the requisition issued under R. 11 of the Rules. In other, words, it was argued that as soon as the goods were brought within octroi limits and the duty was paid, Angadias or carriers of goods ceased to be "importers" of goods and R. 11 of the Rules had no application. This argument found favour with the learned Sessions Judge. It is difficult to understand this line of reasoning for the simple reason that having regard to the definition of the expression "import" in R. 2 (a), the expression "importer" in R. 11 must in the context mean one who imports. That person who brings goods liable to octroi within the Ahmedabad Municipal limits from outside its limits would be an importer of goods. The definition in the Standing Order 2.9 is merely illustrative of persons who can be said to be "importers" within the meaning. of the Rules as well as the Standing Orders. There is no warrant for taking the view that an Angadia who was an importer of goods at the stage of entry ceased to be so on entry and payment of octroi, as such words of limitation do not appear in the Rules or the Standing Orders. The argument that an Angadia is an "importer" within the meaning of Standing Order 2.9 but he cannot be said to be an "importer" within the meaning of the Rules is clearly devoid of merit. There is no rationale to come to the conclusion that a person who is an importer of goods within the meaning of the Standing Orders is not an importer within the meaning of the Rules. To take such a view would tantamount to holding that the definition of the word "importer" in Standing Order 2.9 is not consistent with the Rules. In that event the definition in the Standing Order would clearly conflict with Section 466 which says that the Standing Orders must be consistent with the Act and the Rules. We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a dichotomy is not warranted having regard to the provisions of the Rules and the Standing Orders.
10. The learned Sessions Judge has relied on the requisition form in Sch. 'I' to come to the conclusion that only the owners of goods would be required to answer the said requisition and an Angadia cannot be required to do so. This conclusion is based on the fact that Sch. 'I' uses the language: "You are requested to furnish correct details of imports made by you or on your behalf". This language prima facie gives the impression that the requisition is addressed to the owner and he is asked to furnish correct details of imports made by him or on his behalf. Now if an Angadia imports goods through his employee, he can be asked to furnish details of imports made through his employee under Sch. 'I' to (and) Rule 11 of the Rules. The form of the requisition cannot be decisive of the question whether or not any person other than the owner can be "importer" of goods within the meaning l of R. 11 of the Rules. Once we come to, 1the conclusion that any person who in ports goods within the Ahmedabad Municipal limits is an "importer of goods", he can be called upon by virtue of R. 11 to furnish the particulars sought by the requisition notice per Sch. 'I'. The learned Sessions Judge observes that as no time limits fixed under the Rules within which such a requisition notice can be issued on the importer of goods, considerable hardship would be caused to the Angadias if they are required to furnish the particulars as per the columns of the requisition notice after a long lapse of time. Now those who are carrying on the business of Angadias must maintain a register containing the particulars of imports made by them from time to time. 13esides, if no period of limitation were prescribed within which such a requisition notice can be issued under R.11 of the Rules, the correct interpretation would be that the requisition notice must be issued within a reasonable time which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. This is, however, no argument to come to the conclusion that Angadias cannot be included within the term "importers" in R. 11 of the Rules. Hardship to the Angadias cannot change the meaning to be given to the word "importer" in R. 11 of the Rules. The Angadias who are carrying on large scale business of conveying goods into or out of Octroi limits of the Municipal Corporation from or to any other area must know that they may be called upon to furnish details as per Sch. 'I', of (or) Rule11 of the Rules and must' therefore, maintain proper registers containing those particulars so that they may be able to answer the requisition as and where made by the Corporation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Sessions! Judge was not right in coming to the conclusion that Angadias were not "importers! of goods" within the meaning of R. 11 of the Rules and were, therefore, not require& to answer the requisition contained in Schedule 'I' thereof.