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28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, cannot be made applicable to the alleged misconduct committed by a Presiding Officer of a DRT. Additionally, we may say that the scheme of the 1993 Act clearly gives the supervision and control over Presiding Officers of DRT to the Chairperson, DRAT, and not to Central Government. There is a clear legislative purpose behind this. The purpose clearly is that as far as judicial functions are concerned, the same shall be free from executive interference. Separation of judicial functions form the executive functions has been held to be one of the basic structures of the Constitution. Thus, by maintaining the said separation, the Parliament, by Section 17A of the 1993 Act, has given the power of supervision and control of Presiding Officers, DRT to the Chairperson, DRAT. Once this separation is legislatively recognized, the power of initiating disciplinary enquiry cannot be given to the UOI as it would violate the said separation of power which is one of the basic structures of the Constitution of India. Separation has to be maintained at all times irrespective of whether the Presiding Officer has completed his tenure or not. It would be out of place to hold that the respondent/UOI had no disciplinary control over the Presiding Officer when he is within his statutory tenure but has full disciplinary control over them after their tenure is over in respect of matters during the statutory tenure. That would make the „theory of separation of power‟ a mockery in the eyes of law.

29. In a decision rendered in the case of Advocates-on-Record Association and Another v. UOI, reported at JT 2015 (10) 1, commonly known as NJAC case, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the context of separation of power and independence of judiciary has held as under:

"364. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the above two submissions, dealt with in the preceding two paragraphs. We have already concluded earlier, that the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as a Member of the NJAC, as contemplated under Article 124A(1), in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, would breach the concepts of "separation of powers" and the "independence of the judiciary", which are both undisputedly components of the "basic structure" of the Constitution of India. For exactly the same reasons, we are of the view, that Section 8 of the NJAC Act which provides, that the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Justice, would be the convener of the NJAC, is not sustainable in law. In a body like the NJAC, the administrative functioning cannot be under executive or legislative control. The only remaining alternative, is to vest the administrative control of such a body, with the judiciary. For the above reasons, Section 8 of the NJAC Act would likewise be unsustainable in law."