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The present batch of seven appeals have been preferred by one accused each who was put along with others on trial together by framing charges under sections 364A/34 and 364/149 of the IPC. The trial was held in Sessions Trial Nos. 669 of 2003, 835 of 2003, 286 of 2004 and 392 of 2004, besides, Sessions Trial No. 669A of 2003 which was in respect of appellant Ajit Singh. The judgment in the batch of first four cases was delivered by the Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court - I, Nalanda at Biharsharif on 17th January, 2006 whereas that in the last Sessions Trial bearing number 669A of 2003 while it was also delivered by the same learned court, but on 31st January, 2007. The verdict was of guilt of all the accused persons in commission of the offence under sections 364A/34 of the IPC and each of the seven appellants was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. The appellants have preferred the batch of appeals to challenge the above finding of guilt as recorded by the learned trial judge.

34. So far as complicity of appellant Rakesh Kumar alias Pappu Singh is concerned, it was contended that as regards demand of payment of ransom of rupees two lacs after the release of P.W. 9 and the two criminals being killed by the police near the factory of the victim, he does not appear stating anything which could indicate that the appellant Rakesh Kumar alias Pappu Singh or any other appellant had really participated in demand of ransom or in realization of the same. Similarly, there was complete lack of evidence that the two deceased who were shot and killed by the police were also associated with the appellants and, as such, it could not be said that the appellants had committed the offence of kidnapping of P.W. 9. The police has not brought any evidence on record and the most important witness Sanjay Kumar, the constable who was given Rs.50000 on the day as per the plan of the Superintendent of Police, has not been examined. It was contended by the learned senior counsel that why the victim would be released without payment of ransom, when he had been abducted for the purpose, is not available from the evidence on record and as such, the offence under section 364A of IPC may not be constituted.

44. As regards contention of Shri Rana Pratap Singh, that the offence under section 364A of the IPC is not made out as there was no payment of any ransom to the accused either by the victim or by any one on his behalf. It is proper in order to answering the submission to have a glance of the provision:

"364-A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.--- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter government organization or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."

45. A bare perusal of the provision may indicate that mere kidnapping or abducting a person or keeping such a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction is not an offence under section 364A of the IPC. What it further required to be done is that he should be threatened to be killed or to be hurt or by some conduct that person should have a reasonable apprehension that he may be put to death or hurt or, in fact, some hurt or death had really been caused to such a person. But, the above acts of threatening to cause either death or hurt or in fact causing death or hurt of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted and has been detained may again not complete the offence unless the whole motive, intent and purpose behind doing any of the above acts of kidnapping or abducting, etc. is that a ransom is paid either by the government, any foreign state or international inter governmental organization or any person. If there is no purpose or intent behind the above acts to seek the payment of ransom, then mere kidnapping, etc. as it indicated by the provision of section 364A of IPC shall never constitute an offence. Now, when we consider the language of the above provision, what it speaks of is 'to pay a ransom', which term, to me, connotes an act to be done in future as a consequence of the threat or apprehensions which could be arising out of the acts of the culprits after the kidnapping/abduction had been accomplished and the victim has been detained. The provision, as such, does not envisage that any real instant payment should be made before the person is released. The release of a person even without payment of a ransom may constitute the offence under section 364A of IPC if the evidence brought on record indicated that the acts of kidnapping or abduction, etc. spoken of by the provision were done only with a purpose that any ransom amount was to be paid by any person in future. The person might be a relative of the victim or it may be anyone which is signified by words 'other person'. Not only that, if a person is required to do or abstained from doing any act on account of the acts preceding that condition, then also the acts of kidnapping etc. which are the elements of the sections may constitute an offence under section 364A of IPC.