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3. The lower Court after trial by judgment dated 2-12-1991 found that the respondent is not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and acquitted him.

4. Though the lower Court found that the respondent issued Ext. P1 cheque to the appellant for the discharge of the debt due from him and the cheque was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds and the registered notice issued by the appellant is refused to accept by the respondent, the Court held that the respondent is not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act since the appellant failed to prove that the complaint was filed before the lower Court after the expiry of 15 days from the receipt of notice as contemplated in Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and therefore the complaint is filed before the cause of action had arisen under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act.

6. The respondent contended before the lower Court that since the complaint is filed by the appellant before the expiry of 15 days of the receipt of notice by the respondent as provided under proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the appellant had no cause of action to prosecute the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The lower Court found that though the complaint was filed on 2-6-1990 cognizance of the offence was taken by the lower Court on 6-6-1990 when it was posted for examination of the appellant under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, the complaint filed and cognizance taken before the expiry of 15 days of the refusal of the notice by the respondent, are before the cause of action arose in this case and as such the respondent is not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

21. The above contention raised by the appellant on the basis of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the Court taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. is not sustainable in the above prosecution launched under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stipulates that unless the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the amount of money to the payee or to the holder in due course of the cheque as the case may be, within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act shall not apply. The special provision of Section 138 of the Act stipulates the nature and mode of cause of action and the procedure to be followed for prosecuting for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 142 (a) of the Act states that cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 138 shall be taken only upon a complaint in writing by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be. The period of 15 days given to the drawer of the cheque after the receipt of notice is to enable him to pay the amount due under the cheque to the person claiming under the cheque and it is a pre-requisite or a precondition laid down in caluse (a) of the proviso to Section 138 to confer cause of action upon the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque to prosecute the drawer under Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, unless and until the 15 days after the receipt of notice by the drawer is elapsed, the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, has no cause of action to file complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, expiry of the period of 15 days after the receipt of the notice by the drawer is the pre-requisite or pre-condition for filing a complaint for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Hence the law laid down by the Supreme Court regarding taking cognizance of the offence by the Court under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of the complaint filed before the Court, is not applicable while considering the cause of action for filing complaint under the provisions of Section 138 of the Act.

A single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court also has taken the very same view in the decision in Ashok Verma v. Ritesh Aero 1994 (1) KLT SN page 31, Case No. 28.

23. Considering the object and reasons for enacting Section 138 and the allied provisions in the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is clear that those provisions are intended to prevent bouncing of cheques and to sustain the credibility of commercial transactions. Therefore, the very purpose behind the enactment of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act is clearly understandable that before instituting criminal prosecution against the drawer of the cheque he should be given 15 days time to pay the amount after intimating about the dishonour of the cheque. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that a complaint can be filed the moment the drawer of the cheque refuses to accept the notice sent by the drawee or the holder in due course of the cheque as the case may be, intimating about the dishonour of the cheque and demanding payment of the amount, will defeat the very object and purpose of the enactment of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act since the date of refusal has to be construed as the date of receipt of the notice under the proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, the complaint in this case being filed before the expiry of 15 days of the receipt of notice under the proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Act the appellant had no cause of action to file the complaint against the respondent alleging offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the lower Court is fully justified in finding that the complaint is filed before the cause of action had arisen under Clause (c) of the. proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and no interference regarding that finding is called for in this appeal.