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Showing contexts for: draft document in Narpat Rai Sharma vs Inspector General Of Registration, New ... on 18 March, 1974Matching Fragments
(9) Some examples of the kind of work that a Petition Writer may have to do, have been formulated during arguments. For example, there may be a Will concerning very valuable property which may be a lengthy document, which may require several days of consultation with the writer bifore finalisation. According to the scale, the Petition Writer is only to get Rs. 2.00. If this fee covers the remuneration to be received by the Petition Writer both for drafting the document as well as for writing it out, it will be less than what a typist would get for typing out the same. It is a matter of common knowledge that generally a Will, say, of three or four pages will cost Rs. 2.00 for typing, or may be more. According to this scale, the typist will get more than the Petition Writer. If the scale of fees is put into strict operation, it will mean that no Petition Writer will be able to function as such, because the remuneration he will draw for his work, will put him out of business. This is the argument advanced for the purpose of challenging the reasonableness of the scale of fees prescribed.
(13) In my view. the key to the interpretation of Rule 13 lies in the opening words, which I have reproduced above. The words are : 'No Document-writer shall charge fees for writing documents in excess of those mentioned below.' The particular emphasis, for purposes of interpretation has to be put on the words 'writing documents' The functions of a Petition Writer may vary from case to case For instance, he may be called, to write out a document of a formal nature ; or, he might be called as an expert to draft a difficult document. His function in these two cases will not be the same. Turning again to the list of documents mentioned in Rule !3, it will be seen that some of the documents are technical in nature, examples of this item are (i) an application for inspection or item (ii), an application for 'issue of process. Such documents are obviously routine in nature and, therefore, do not require any particular application of mind. The fees for such documents are perfectly in order, and cannot be held to be unreasonable. On the other hand, if a document is to be written out at the dictation of the executant and, I again emphasie 'dictation of the executant\ then there is nothing wrong in the fees prescribed. The fees would in that case cover only the cost of getting the documents written out by a Document Writer. No application of mind by the Document Writer for the purpose of drafting such a document would be involved. Thus, a Will, an agreement, a sale-deed, a lease-deed or a mortgage might be dictated by the executant or executants, and if so dictated, the prescribed fees would be perfectly valid charges covering the cost of writing out the document. On the other hand, the executant might require the Petition Writer or . Document Writer to apply his own mind for the purpose of writing out these documents. For instance, there might be a partnership deed, which might require the introduction of certain clauses, concerning which the partners might not be able to agree among themselves. In such cases, the fees of Rs.2.00 as provided by item (viii) of Rule 13 would be wholly unreasonable, and therefore, J think that the Petition Writer would be entitled to charge his own fees for drafting as opposed to writing out such a document. As to how much he should charge for doing the work of drafting a document, I do not think that that can be the subject-matter of a rule made by the Inspector General. This is a question which has to be decided by agreement between the party requesting the Document Writer to draft out the document and the Documentnt Writer. Thus, on general principles, 1. am of the view that a Document Writer can charge a fee for writing a document, and he can also charge a fee for drafting such a document. By writing a document, I understand the writing of a document without any application of the writer's own mind ; by drafting a document, I understand a document drafted in accordance with the expert knowledge of the person concerned. Thus. if an executant wants a Document Writer to write out a document which is dictated by himself, he will have to pay the fees prescribed by Rule 13. If he.wants tile Document Writer to draft out a document, then he will have to pay additional charges for drafting out the document. I do not think the words 'for writing documents' occurring in Rule 13 can restrict the amount of fees that can be charged by a Document Writer for drafting out documents which he has eventually to write out. Viewed in this way, the Rules are limited only to the fees to be charged for writing out the documents. The additional fees, or expenses for drafting, or other expenses cannot be included in these writing charges.
(14) Inview of the interpretation I have placed on the Rules, I think that they can be reasonably interpreted to permit Document Writers charging additional fees, where additional services are required, such as preparing drafts or consultations with the parties for preparing the substance of their agreement, etc. In other words, a Document Writer may, if he is not only acting as a writer, charge fees for additional services rendered by him.
(15) The prayer in the Writ Petition is for quashing the entire notification and also for declaring Section 69(l)(bb) of the Act as ultra vires. In view of the interpretation placed by me on the Rules. I do not think it is necessary to hold the Notification to be ultra vires. As I have already stated above. Rule 3(2) is ultra vires, as held by Hardy, J. in the aforementioned judgment. The other Rules are not ultra vires, if they are read in the manner set out above. Turning now to Section 69(l)(bb); although, this provision is challenged on the ground of the delegated Legislation, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that if the interpretation placed by him on the aforementioned Rules is adopted, then it will not be necessary for the purpose of these proceedings to deal with the question of delegated Legislation. It is, however, necessary to make certain observations in connection with the Section which will not be out of place in this case. The rule making power of the Inspector General is concerned with superintendenee over the Registration Offices in the territories under the State Government. And, therefore, the Rules framed under Section 69(l)(bb) cannot be read beyond the context of the rule making power. This means that the rules are not of general application, but of limited application. This has to be explained in some greater detail.