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(c) and would contend that strict rules of pleadings are not applicable to the Application under DV Act.

14. Rival contentions now fall for determination.

15. First and foremost, it is necessary to determine the nature of interim reliefs which can be granted under Section 23 of DV Act. The Section reads thus:

"23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.--

(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.

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16. Section 23 empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and exparte orders under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 or as the case may be under Section 22 against the Respondent upon arriving at a prima facie satisfaction of commission of act of domestic violence or even a likelihood of commission Section 23 restricts the reliefs which may be granted under Section 23 of DV Act to the ones under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 or as the case may be under Section 22 and no further. Protection orders may be granted under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19, monetary reliefs under Section 20, custody orders under Section 21 and compensation orders under Section 22. Sections 18 to 20 further enumerates the varied reliefs which may be granted under the said sections.

e) For any other and further reliefs this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice and equity."

18. Prayer Clause (a) has been granted and prayer clause (b) to (d) have been refused. Prayer clause (b) would indicate that what is sought by the Applicant is a blanket injunction restraining the Respondent from taking any woman in Gulshan Terrace Flat. Whether the Magistrate under Section 23 of DV Act is empowered to grant blanket injunction of the nature sought by the Applicant will have to be tested. Section 18 and 19 of DV Act provides for the prohibitory orders which can be passed by the Magistrate. According to Ms. Irani, the relief under prayer clause (b) can be granted under 12 of 17 4crirevn296-2023 Section 18(e). It is clear from reading of sub section (e) of Section 18 that the same provides for issuing prohibitory orders from alienating the assets. The Applicant's case is not of alienation of Gulshan Terrace flat and what is sought is restraining orders from taking any woman in the said flat. The said relief could have been relatable to the residence orders which can be passed under Section 19 of DV Act which empowers passing of restraining orders from dispossessing the aggrieved person from shared household, directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household, restraining the respondent of any of his relatives from entering any portion of shared household where the aggrieved person resides and so on. More particularly sub section (c) of Section 19 could have been invoked to seek restraining orders, the caveat being that the Applicant is residing in Gulshan Terrace flat. In that event, the prohibition from entering into that portion of shared household could have been granted as against the Respondent or any of his relatives. It is the Applicant's own pleading that the Respondent in the year 2012 had left the marital home and established an independent residence at Gulshan Terrace and that she is residing at Turel Terrace. As such, even under Section 19 of DV Act the relief sought under prayer clause (b) could not have been granted.

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19. The provisions of Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act would indicate that no power vests in the Magistrate to grant any such blanket injunction even if it is held that the premises is a jointly owned matrimonial house of the Applicant. Prayer clause (b) apart from being vague is not relatable to any of the reliefs which could be granted under Section 23 of DV Act. The decision of Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti vs State of Maharashtra & Anr (supra) has laid down that under Section 23 of DV Act, the Magistrate can grant ex-parte interim reliefs in terms of reliefs under Section 18 to Section 22 of DV Act. In view of the clear enunciation of law by this Court, as the relief sought in prayer clause (b) is not maintainable, the entire discussion whether the particular woman is impleaded or not and whether the proviso to Section 19(b) can be said to be applicable is irrelevant.