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11. Their Lordships have already observed that it appears to be open to doubt whether the High Court did not base its judgment on the part of the Statute which relates to limitation properly so called,-namely, on Article 31 of Part v. of the second schedule, which limits the time for bringing suits for the obstruction of watercourses to two years "from the date of the obstruction." The judgment contains this passage: "We find that the plaintiff, in order that he may obtain relief in respect of an infringement of his easement, must come into Court within two years from the time when such infringement took place." If the Judges really meant to apply the limitation of Article 31 above referred to, their decision is clearly wrong for the obstructions which interfered with the flow of water to the plaintiff's mehal were in the nature of continuing nuisances, as to which the cause of action was renewed de die in diem, so long as the obstructions causing such interference were allowed to continue. Indeed, Section 24 of the Statute contains express provision to that effect. For these reasons, their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the High Court with regard to the two obstructions in question cannot be sustained, and that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge as regards these obstructions ought to be restored.