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Showing contexts for: right to life in Lilawati Mishra vs The State Of Bihar on 11 May, 2022Matching Fragments
23. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in Olga Tellis (supra), stand reiterated by a Constitution Bench (Nine Judges) in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & another v.
Union of India and others, AIR 2017 SC 4161, in the following terms:
Patna High Court CWJC No.6852 of 2021 dt.11-05-2022 "114. In Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation195, Chandrachud C J, while explaining the ambit of Article 21 found a rationale for protecting the right to livelihood as an incident of the right to life. For, as the Court held, deprivation of livelihood would result in the abrogation of the right to life: "148. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the 195 (1985) 3 SCC 545 PART I 111 life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life liveable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life..."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. That 'right to life' includes 'right to livelihood' stood settled way back in by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the year 1991. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & others, 1991 Supp(1) SCC 600, while dealing with the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, enabling the employer to terminate services of the employee by issuance of one month notice or payment in lieu thereof, the Court held that:
"262. The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. It was further held that income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental and fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications.
27. That right to life, enshrined in Article 21, would include right to livelihood, stood reiterated by the Apex Court in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259, in the following terms: