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1. Some unusual and difficult points have been raised and urged in the course of the argument in these second appeals. The present appellants, it must in limine be observed, were not parties personally to the litigation or decree in the lower appellate Court and they have sought to file this appeal as the present trustees or dharmakarthas of Kasi Viswanatha Swami temple, Sivakasi. Their case is that there were two former trustees or dharmakarthas of this temple, that both of them tendered their resignation on or about the 8th July 1922, that one of the trustees died in January 1923, leaving the other alone surviving, that the resignation of the surviving trustee was accepted by the temple committee on or about the 5th August 1923, that the present appellants were appointed by the committee as the two trustees for the devasthanam and that they took over charge on the 13th January 1924. In the meantime after the death of one of the trustees and also after the acceptance by the committee of the resignation of the trusteeship by the surviving trustee on or about the 24th November 1923 the appeal in the lower appellate Court was heard after argument by the vakil appointed by the old trustees and decided against the devasthanam. The present trustees have not made themselves parties or brought themselves on the record in the lower appellate Court. The first question, therefore, that arises for determination is whether, having regard to the very contentions of the appellants that they became trustees not after the decree of the lower appellate Court but before the. judgment in the appeal, and they not having brought themselves on the record in the lower appellate Court, it is competent to them to sustain this appeal-It seems to me that in the view I have taken of the contentions on behalf of the appellants with regard to the other points in this appeal it is not necessary for me to express any final opinion on this point. It is no doubt difficult and I must confess that the matter has not been fully or sufficiently argued before us so as to enable us to express any decisive opinion thereon. It is sufficient for me to observe that such a question is really fraught with a great deal of difficulty having regard to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the practice of the Courts. Assuming therefore for the purposes of this discussion that the appeal is competent, that the appellants are entitled to come to this Court and complain about the decree having been passed, the only objection taken on behalf of the appellants to the decree is not on the merits but merely on the ground that the appeal was heard at a time when even the surviving trustees of the devasthanam had ceased in law to be a trustee by reason of his resignation having been accepted in August previous and by reason also of a valid appointment to the trusteeship having been made by the committee. It is unfortunate that the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants in this case have not even been noticed in the grounds of appeal and no intimation given to the respondents that the appellants were proposing to rely upon the averments in these affidavits for the purpose of their argument. I may observe that with reference to the practice in these 'Courts it is very desirable when parties propose to rely upon affidavits express reference] should be made to the affidavits if not in the grounds of appeal at any rate sufficiently otherwise.

2. It is also regrettable that these affidavits have not been got translated and printed for the purpose of easy reference in Court. But we have had the affidavits read to us and I am constrained to observe that the affidavits are phenomenally vague and indefinite. As regards the most important point in the case the new trustees (appellants) taking over charge of the office of trusteeship the passive voice is used in the affidavit and there is no information furnished as regards the person from whom the new trustees took over charge. In these circumstances I must assume as in the ordinary course that the new trustees took over charge on the 13th January 1924 from the old surviving trustee, because in the absence of any other information he would be the only person to hand over charge to the new trustee. If so, it follows that till he handed over charge on the 13th January 1924, even though he had resigned and even though such resignation had been accepted and new trustees had been appointed, the new trustees did not take over charge but he continued de facto as trustee. The question then is whether the mere fact of the appointment of two new trustees by the temple committee even though the two trustees did not take over charge of the office of trusteeship renders a nullity the decree and judgment passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The argument by the learned vakil for the appellants was put thus. The idol no doubt is a juristic person but there must be other persons who must sue or be sued in respect of the rights vested in the idol and if a trustee sues as a person entitled to do so on behalf of an idol he ceases to be a person competent to represent the idol the moment he ceased to be a trustee and he ceases to be trustee at any rate when his resignation was finally accepted.

7. Following decision in S. A. No. 1194 of 1924, S. A. Nos. 1195 and 1196 of 1924 are dismissed with costs.

Reilly, J.

8. The appellants before as have put in some obviously defective affidavits; but they have not chosen to supply us with any definite evidence when Muthuswami Mudaliar, the survivor of the two original trustees, handed over the charge of his office, or that he was not in office at the time when the learned Subordinate Judge heard these three appeals. That being so, they have failed to make out that the decrees of the Subordinate Judge are defective. For that reason, which is quite sufficient, I agree that these second appeals should be dismissed. I prefer not to express any opinion on this occasion on the other interesting points which have been argued before us.