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Showing contexts for: attempt to commit extortion in State vs . Mohd. Naseer on 31 July, 2023Matching Fragments
387. Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.--Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Pertinently, the provisions from Sec. 383 to 389 IPC are essentially divided into two categories of extortion. The offence of Extortion, as defined in S. 383, when complete by satisfaction of all the three aforesaid ingredients, is dealt with and made punishable u/s. 384, Sec. 386 or 388 IPC subject to fulfilment of additional ingredients mentioned therein and difference being in degree of gravity. The other category of extortion relates to those acts where the transaction of extortion is not complete due to the last ingredient of delivery of property/valuable or valuable security being missing, despite the former two ingredients of fear of injury and inducement being satisfied. These sections are Sec. 385, 387 and 389. The common thread running through the said three sections is the expression "whoever in order to the committing of extortion ..........." which is employed in these three sections making the legislative intent clear that they relate to a situation where the accused, in order to commit extortion, puts the victim in fear of injury to cause inducement but not leading to any delivery of property/valuables in favour of accused. Therefore, it is obvious that the provision from Sec. 385, 387 and 389 of IPC relate exclusively to instances of attempted extortion where entire transaction of extortion as defined in Sec. 383 IPC is not complete. Consequently, since the commission of extortion and an attempt to commit extortion are both provided for in the sections from Sec. 383 to 389, the resort to residuary provision mentioned u/s 511 of IPC is uncalled for.
9. The offence in question of extortion is a serious offence which is considered to be graver than theft but not as grave as robbery. However, the seriousness of the offence of extortion, is evident from the very fact that attempt to commit extortion is separately punishable u/s. 385, 387 and 389 of IPC.
10. Testing the attending factual matrix on the anvil of legal provision and the analysis made (supra), it is seen that charge-sheet reveals that the first two foundational ingredients of extortion i.e. of putting the victim/Rupali Singh in fear of hurt to her/her family and thereby inducing her to part with property/valuable security have been alleged. However, the fact remains that the victim did not part with any money. What is equally damaging is the fact that the prosecution never brought on record the alleged threatening text message or the cell phone. Apart from the fact the custody of the cell phone allegedly used in the commission of crime could not be established with Mohd. Naseer, his location at the time of sending of the alleged threatening text/call could not established with the Juvenile Vishal, who had allegedly sent the said message at the behest of accused Mohd. Naseer. There is no chain of evidence whatsoever, direct or circumstantial linking the accused Mohd. Naseer with the alleged offence. Juvenile Vishal never testified against the accused Mohd. Naseer. No threat emanated directly from accused Mohd. Naseer to victim Rupali Singh. There was no proof of common intention to commit the alleged crimes established between accused Mohd. Naseer and co-accused JCL Vishal. Merely insinuating that accused Mohd. Naseer had anything to do with the offence alleged without cogent and clear proof would not satisfy the burden cast upon the prosecution.