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6. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Advocate General and following him Dr. A.C. Gupta contended first that Entry 25 Gas and Gas Works in the State List was carved out as a separate exception to Entry 24 in State List and entry 52 in the Union List regarding Industries. In other words, the contention was that where the general enactment or general works were followed by particular enactment; or words the latter would over-rule the former and the result would be that entry 2-5 in State List under the heading Gas and Gas works was in express language an exception to Entry regarding Industries. Secondly, it was contended that the impugned legislation was in pith and substance and true character and purpose a legislation for requisition of property and was a valid legislation under Entry 42 in the concurrent List. Thirdly, it was contended that the entry Gas and Gas Works was a composite one and it could not be truncated into either an entry relating to Gas or to Gas Works but was to be treated as a composite entry of Gas and Gas Works. Fourthly it was contended that the impugned legislation was in pith and substance a legislation under entry Gas and Gas Works. Finally it was contended that the pith and substance of the impugned legislation was that it was not a legislation in relation to any industry within the meaning and field of the Parliament Act of 1951.

"It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal, interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere."

14. In the case of Governor-General iu Council v. Province of Madras , a question arose as to whether Madras General Sales Tax Act which imposed an annual tax on every dealer in respect of his turn over was in its general scope and in its detailed provision in pith and substance an Act imposing a tax on the sale of goods and was intra vires the provincial legislature under Entry 48 of the provincial legislative list or whether it was a legislation within entry No. 45 of the Federal List. Entry 45 was duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India. Entry 48 was taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements. Lord Simonds said that it was right first to consider whether a lair reconciliation could not be effected by giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, was yet one that could properly be given to it and equally giving to the language of the provincial legislative list a meaning which it could properly bear. In that particular case the Act was examined and its real nature was found to be a tax on the sale of goods. The term 'duty of excise' covers a tax on first, and perhaps, on other sales, A duty of excise would primarily be. a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer. It is a tax on goods, not on sales or proceeds of sales. St was thus held that the Madras Act was not a duty of excise in the cloak of a tax on sales. It was also held that the State could impose a tax on sale of goods when manufactured. In the case of Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, 74 Ind App 23 : (AIR 1947 PC 60), a question arose as to whether Bengal Money Lenders Act was a subject matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature under Entry 27 of List 2 or whether it was a legislation on promissory notes and banking being the subject-matter reserved for the Federal Legislature under Entries 28 and 38 of List 1. It was contended that item 28 of List 1 should be reconciled with item 27 of List 2 and so read item 27 would be a particular exception from the general provision of item 28 of List 1. Secondly, that the impugned Act was In pith and substance an Act with respect to money-lending and money-lenders and was not void because it incidentally trenched on matters outside the authorised field. Lord Porter said that it was not possible to make so clean a cut between the powers of various legislatures and they were bound to overlap from time to time. If subjects overlap the question had to be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint was made. Lord Porter said :

15. The application of the pith and substance doctrine is illustrated in the decisions of State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, (Bombay City Civil Court Act case), 1951 SCR 682 : (AIR 1951 SC 318), (Bombay Prohibition Act case) and State of Rajasthan v. G. Chowla, , (Thy Ajmere Sound Amplifiers Control Act case) and Jnan Prasanna v. Province of West Bengal, ILR (1949) 2 Cal 94 at p. 131 : (AIR 1949 Cal 1 at p. 9) (FB). In the Bombay City Civil Court Act case, , the question arose as to whether the Bombay City Civil Court Act was valid. It was contended that the Provincial legislature had no power to make laws with respect to jurisdiction of Courts in regard to suits on promissory notes which was a matter covered by item 53 of list 1 and that Bombay City Civil Court Act was therefore ultra vires. It was held by the Supreme Court that inasmuch as the impugned Act was in pith and substance a law in respect to a matter covered by list 2, the fact that it incidentally affected suits relating to promissory notes on subject falling within items 28 and 53 of list 1 would not affect its. validity. In the Bombay Prohibition Act case, 1951 SCR 682 : (AIR 1951 SC 318), the question arose as to whether the legislation was valid under the said list being entry 31 of list 2 or whether the legislation transgressed entry 19 of list 1. Entry 31 of list 2 read as intoxicating and narcotic drugs, entry 19 of list 1 read as import and export across the customs frontier, as defined by the Dominion Government. It was held that the validity of an Act was not affected for it incidentally trenched on matters outside the authorised field and therefore-it was necessary to enquire in each case what was the pith and substance of the Act impugned. If the Act when so viewed substantially fell within the powers expressly conferred upon the legislature which enacted it, then it could not be held to be invalid merely because it encroached on matters which had been assigned to another legislation. With these observations it was held that if the true nature and character of the legislation or its pith and substance was not import and export of intoxicating liquor but sale and possession then it would be difficult to declare the Act to be invalid. It was contended in that case that prohibition of purchase, use, possession, transport and sale of liquor would affect its import. That contention was repelled by holding that even assuming that such a result might follow, the encroachment, if any, was only incidental and could not affect competence of the provincial legislature to enact the law in question. In the Ajmere Sound and Amplifiers case, , the contention was that the Ajmere Acf was valid under entry 1 of the State list and the other contention was that the legislation came within entry 31 of the Union list. The Union list entry dealt with telephone, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication. Entry 1 of the State list deals with public order and entry 6 in the State list deals with public health, sanitation etc. The State of Rajasthan relied on entry 1 or in combination with entry No. 6 of the State list. The contention of the State was upheld with the observations :

"Legislators in our country possess plenary powers of legislation. This is so even after the division of the legislative powers, subject to this that the supremacy of the legislatures is confined to the topics mentioned as entries in the list conferring respective powers on them. These entries, it has been ruled on many an occasion, though meant to be mutually exclusive are sometimes not really so. They occasionally overlap and are to be regarded as enumeratio simplex of broad categories. Where in an organic instrument such enumerated powers of legislation exist and there is a conflict between them it is necessary to examine the impugned legislation in its pith and substance, and only if that pith and substance falls substantially within the entry or entries conferring legislative power, is the legislation valid, a slight transgression upon a rival list notwithstanding".